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Despite occasional suggestions to the contrary, the Supreme Court has
long since stopped interpreting the Constitution to afford special protection to
certain groups on the ground that they are powerless to defend their own
interests in the political process. From a series of decisions reviewing laws that
burden whites under the same strict scrutiny as laws that burden racial
minorities, to the more recent same-sex marriage decision based principally on
the fundamental nature of marriage (rather than the political status of gays
and lesbians), it is now an uncontroversial observation that when it comes to
applying the open-textured provisions of the Constitution, the Court sees no
distinction between the powerless and powerful.
This Article challenges that conventional wisdom from a perhaps
unexpected direction. I argue that the Court has gone further than to merely
reject the political process theory of constitutional interpretation, under which
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powerless discrete and insular minority groups alone would be entitled to
heightened judicial solicitude. In several doctrinal areas, the Court has reversed
the theory's core prescription by conferring extra constitutional safeguards upon
entities that, by any fair accounting, possess an outsized ability to protect their
interests through the ordinary democratic process-all while withholding
similar protections from less powerful counterparts.
After describing these doctrinal developments, this Article offers a
critical account of the Court's long and tumultuous relationship with political
process theory. I conclude that although opponents of the theory may have been
fair to question its ability to restrain judges as a positive principle of
constitutional adjudication, political process theory ought to retain force as a
negative command. That is to say, even if one believes judges cannot avoid
substantive value judgments when deciding which groups are so powerless as
to warrant extraordinary protection from the democratic bazaar, attention to
the political process should still require judges to stay their hand before
granting special constitutional treatment to entities that are powerful enough
to look out for themselves.
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INTRODUCTION
Under the standard account, the story of political process theory
in American constitutional law has unfolded as a two-act tragedy.' In
Act I, political process theory enters the scene as an answer to the
"counter-majoritarian difficulty," 2 or the inherent democratic tension
presented when unelected judges strike down laws enacted by
politically accountable legislators. The theory promises to stop judges
from using the underdetermined provisions of the Constitution to bring
about their preferred policy preferences by limiting judicial
intervention to situations "when the . . . political market[] is
systematically malfunctioning." 3 Political process theory, in other
words, resolves the counter-majoritarian difficulty by confining judges
to the role of "referees" and not players in the game of lawmaking: it is
only when the system is infected with "prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities" that "curtail[s] the operation of th[e] political
1. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90
MICH. L. REV. 213, 223-26, 314-15 (1991) (describing the emergence of political process theory as
well as its fall in the affirmative action context); Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The
Allure and Failure of Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721 (1991) (describing political process
theory's ascendance and demise); Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory
Through the Lens of the Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1365-66 (2011) (arguing that
despite the theory's achievement of "canonical status," it has "mostly fizzled in the case law," as
evidenced by the "use of strict scrutiny to strike down affirmative action programs challenged by
whites" and the fact that "the Court has not ... [adopted] heightened scrutiny for any new
classification in decades").
2. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962).
3. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103 (1980).
Ely's explication of political process theory expounds on the ever-famous footnote four of Justice
Stone's opinion for the Court in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938), discussed infra notes 38-45.
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proces[s]" that judges may engage in "more searching judicial inquiry"
of resulting laws. 4
Alas, political process theory's triumph is short-lived. If Act I is
subtitled "political process theory," then Act II would be captioned
"anti-political process theory." Indeed, Act II barely opens before critics
from across the political spectrum challenge the theory's central
claims.5 The most devastating charge is that process theory invites the
very value judgments by unelected judges that the theory sought to
pretermit.6 As Professor Bruce Ackerman has explained, when a
process-attuned court "undertakes to identify the prejudices that entitle
a group to special protection," it cannot do so "without performing the
substantive analysis of constitutional values that [the theory] hopes to
avoid."7 After all, how are judges to decide which groups have been
sufficiently prejudiced in the democratic process to warrant special
protection?" And so the tragic conclusion of Act II is the fall of process
theory in cases like Bakke and Croson, where the Court holds that all
race-based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the
group they burden; the powerless and powerful are to be treated one
and the same.9
I argue in this Article that this conventional two-act telling is
incomplete. In recent years, the Supreme Court has quietly written a
third act to the play that is best captioned "reverse political process
theory." For rather than merely rejecting the notion that politically
powerless groups should be entitled to special judicial solicitude, the
Court has swung further away from process theory's driving concern. It
has swung so far, in fact, as to afford special protections via
underdetermined constitutional provisions to politically powerful
entities that are able to advance their interests full well in the
4. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. Political process theory has another, less
controversial precept that is not the focus of this Article: that strict scrutiny is warranted when
legislation "restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation." Id.; see infra note 42 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAw 197-99 (1990); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713
(1985); Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131, 142 (1982); Laurence H. Tribe,
The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
6. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA.
L. REV. 747, 787 (1991) ("[D]istinguishing justifiable from unjustifiable disadvantaging [of
minorities] quite plainly requires a substantive value choice .... ); see also Brest, supra note 5, at
131 ("[Miost instances of representation-reinforcing review demand value judgments not different
in kind or scope from the fundamental values sort.").
7. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 737.
8. See infra Section I.B.
9. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
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democratic arena-precisely the opposite of the kind of groups who
animated the theory at the outset. The major plot development of Act
III, in other words, is the Court's inversion (and not just its rejection) of
political process theory's core tenet, that laws disadvantaging the
powerless ought to receive stricter judicial scrutiny than laws
disadvantaging the powerful.
This reversal has arguably occurred in a number of doctrinal
areas, five of which are discussed in this Article. First, the Supreme
Court has held that large multinational and U.S. corporations can no
longer be subjected to general personal jurisdiction based on their
continuous and systematic contacts with a forum state, overriding the
rule ratified long ago by lawmakers in the form of state long-arm
statutes.10 The Court has reasoned, however, that the same quantum of
contacts may be sufficient to impose general jurisdiction against
smaller businesses, and that a far smaller quantum may be sufficient
for purposes of general jurisdiction against individuals." The upshot is
that the largest, wealthiest, and most powerful corporations now enjoy
a unique procedural defense under the open-textured Due Process
Clause, despite the fact that those very corporations were unable to
persuade state legislatures to enshrine the same rule. 12
Second, the Court has fashioned enhanced protections for
government defendants attendant to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, none of which are called for by the text of the Constitution.
The most striking example is the "super-strong clear statement rule"
that the Court has applied to determine whether a sovereign has
waived its immunity from suit.1 3 Following this much-criticized
approach, 14 the Court has dismissed suits against sovereign defendants
that have indisputably injured plaintiffs even where the relevant
statutory text, purpose, and history are best understood as waiving the
10. See infra Section II.A.
11. See infra Section II.A.
12. See infra Section IIA; see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 771 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]o the degree that the majority worries .. . [about]
the economic interests of multinational businesses . . . the task of weighing those policy concerns
belongs ultimately to legislators . . . [and] the democratic process.").
13. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 643 (1992) (arguing that the
Court has created a "super-strong clear statement rule against" waivers of sovereign immunity).
14. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk, Twilight for the Strict Construction of Waivers of Federal
Sovereign Immunity, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1245, 1252 (2014) (criticizing the Court's "hostile and narrow
construction" of immunity waivers); John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV.
1121, 1130 (1993) (urging Congress to "revers[e] the rule of strict construction that is supported
by nothing more than irrelevant history").
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sovereign's immunity. 15 This solicitude for sovereign defendants stands
in stark contrast to the judge-made rules governing waiver of
constitutional rights held by less powerful parties. For example, a
person suspected of a crime who finds himself in police interrogation
will be found to have waived his right to remain silent unless he
affirmatively and unambiguously invokes it-the opposite of the rule
afforded to sovereign defendants. 16 The Supreme Court has accordingly
held that a suspect who remained essentially silent for nearly three
hours of interrogation nonetheless waived his right to remain silent by
subsequently answering a yes-or-no question.1 7
Third, in the aftermath of Citizens United v. FEC, corporations
and unions both enjoy the right to use unlimited general treasury funds
on political expenditures.1 8 As Professor Benjamin Sachs has argued,
however, that facial symmetry conceals a deeper inequality: whereas
shareholders-many of whom face economic pressure to participate in
the stock market-hold no right to opt-out of corporate political speech
to which they object, objecting workers have a First Amendment right
to opt-out of political speech by their unions.1 9
Fourth, Professor Reva Siegel has argued that Equal Protection
law now affords greater protection to whites than it does to racial
minorities in an important respect. 20 Whereas whites who challenge
affirmative action policies receive the benefit of strict scrutiny even if
they cannot show that the policies were motivated by any invidious
government purpose, racial minorities challenging facially neutral
policies with equally (or more) harmful effects receive a far more
deferential brand of review unless discriminatory purpose can first be
demonstrated. 21
Fifth, police officer (and other individual state) defendants
possess a qualified immunity defense to tort litigation that plausibly
derives from constitutional principles of Due Process.2 2 No individual
15. For examples of this, see infra Section I.B.
16. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 385 (2010) ("[A] waiver of [the right to remain
silent] may be implied through 'the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his
rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver.'" (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S.
369, 373 (1979))).
17. Id. at 385-87.
18. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
19. See Benjamin Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens
United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (2012).
20. Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2013).
21. Id.
22. See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2896508 [https://perma.cc/3WAY-UE9V].
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officer, the theory goes, may be deprived of her property in a tort suit
simply because she has made a reasonable mistake of law, a kind of fair
notice concept that is implemented through a rule that officers may only
be liable under § 1983 for violating clearly established law. 2 3 Yet this
ignorance-of-the-law defense is famously unavailable to less politically
powerful criminal defendants in mine-run criminal prosecutions. 24
In each of these settings, there is a reasonable claim that the
Supreme Court's inconsistent rulings-granting protection under open-
textured constitutional provisions to some groups but not others-have
privileged the more powerful class of litigants. Large corporations,
sovereign defendants, whites, and individual state officers benefit from
rules that the Supreme Court has refused to extend to small businesses,
criminal suspects, racial minorities, and criminal defendants.
What should we make of this? This Article grapples with that
question in four parts. Part I tracks the first two acts of the story of
political process theory, recounting in brief form the rise and fall of the
theory as an answer to the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Part II then
describes how the Court has granted arguably greater constitutional
protection to the powerful than the powerless in the five contexts just
mentioned.
Part III offers a normative analysis of this development. I
suggest that there are two coherent positions one might take. First, one
could give up the critiques of process theory that prevailed in Act II and
decide that when it comes to the difficult task of constitutional
construction, judges may be in the business of picking which groups to
afford special protections based on different background values they
infer from the Constitution. 25 Second, one could acknowledge the
inevitable role of normative values in the course of constitutional
construction without sacrificing the anti-process theory criticisms
raised during Act 11.26 Under this view, the proper approach to the cases
described in this Article would be to treat laws disadvantaging more
powerful entities the same as-that is to say, no more skeptically
than-laws disadvantaging less powerful ones. Significantly, the
background values supporting this approach may verge on something
23. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
24. See infra Section II.E.
25. As I explain below, infra Section III.A, the starting point for the analysis here is the
distinction between constitutional interpretation and construction. See Lawrence B. Solum, The
Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010).
26. See Solum, supra note 25, at 104 (arguing that constitutional construction "cannot be
value neutral' because we cannot tell whether a construction is correct or incorrect without"
reference to "some kind of normative argument").
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of an overlapping consensus: critics of political process theory would be
wary of judges inserting their own subjective preferences regarding
corporate and government amenability to suit in place of policy choices
made by elected officials, while process theory's proponents would agree
that, at bare minimum, the politically powerful should receive judicial
treatment no better than the powerless.
My own sense is that the latter position is more attractive in that
it respects the will of democratic majorities exactly when the political
process might be trusted the most-when the powerful groups that
often win come out on bottom. If that is right, then the telling of process
theory's third act should yield the following conceptual payoff. Even if
one rejects the theory as an argument for when courts should strike
down laws (i.e., when they disadvantage the powerless), one may
nonetheless adopt the theory in its reverse: as a theory for when judges
should be especially deferential to democratic choices (i.e., when they
disadvantage powerful groups that can protect themselves).
Part IV applies this reverse conception of political process theory
to the five cases discussed earlier. A conclusion follows, with some
thoughts on how reverse political process theory might apply to the
major issue that has emerged recently in the law of personal
jurisdiction: whether corporations may be required to consent to
general jurisdiction as a condition of doing business in a state.
A few caveats are in order before I turn to the substance. First,
in describing the Court's jurisprudence in the personal jurisdiction,
sovereign immunity, union opt-out, and other areas, I do not mean to
imply that the Court has purposefully embarked on a process-driven
path of interpreting the Constitution to the comparative advantage of
politically powerful entities. Such an explicit move would be quite
difficult to defend on its own terms, so it is no surprise that the Court
has justified its decisions using non-process-based rationales internal
to those doctrinal areas. Second, and illustrative of the initial caveat,
the third act is in one sense only a partial picture: the Court has not
granted additional protections to powerful entities in every doctrinal
sphere. For instance, the primary controversy wrought by Citizens
United v. FEC was to treat corporations on equal terms with individuals
regarding campaign expenditure limits. 2 7 Nonetheless, I shall argue
that it is still worth examining why the Court has often chosen to
distrust the democratic process when it harms powerful business and
government defendants, but not when it harms less powerful
individuals and entities.
27. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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Third, I should acknowledge a pair of ways in which the Article's
choice of cases on which to focus may seem somewhat less than
intuitive. For one thing, personal jurisdiction, sovereign immunity,
union opt-outs, and qualified immunity are not likely to spring to mind
when one thinks of political process theory in doctrinal terms; the
theory is instead most naturally associated with the Equal Protection
Clause.28 But the notion that political process considerations ought to
be fair game when a judge confronts an underdetermined constitutional
provision is not self-limiting to the Equal Protection Clause. 29 In that
respect, one modest goal of this Article is to revive a broader
understanding of political process theory's domain.
More significantly, most close followers of the Supreme Court
would probably not name these cases if asked to identify the weightiest
situations in which the Court has recently granted constitutional
protection to powerful groups despite an uncertain textual foothold.
More obvious cases might include the Court's extension of gun rights to
a group powerfully represented by special interests in D.C. v. Heller,30
or the expansion of economic privileges afforded to corporations under
the First Amendment-so-called First Amendment Lochnerism.31 Still
others may think of the same-sex marriage debate as a circumstance
where a minority group of debatable political strength received relief
from the Court.32
I certainly agree that these cases present interesting political
process issues, insofar as the underlying policy questions may be better
entrusted to the ordinary democratic process in light of the
underdetermined nature of the constitutional text in play and
contestable arguments about the influence wielded by the groups
seeking redress. But Heller, First Amendment Lochnerism, and same-
sex marriage do not implicate the distinctive problem presented here:
the Supreme Court's emerging pattern of not only granting protection
from political defeat to powerful groups in the absence of determinate
constitutional text, but doing so even as it withholds the same
protection from similarly situated, less powerful counterparts. This
28. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
29. See ELY, supra note 3, at 172-79 (applying the theory to several open-textured
constitutional provisions).
30. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
31. See generally Jeremy Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 1915 (2016).
32. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2014), rev'd sub nom. Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) ("[W]e have an eleven-year record marked by nearly as many
[political] successes as defeats . . . . 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' is gone.").
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Article focuses on that development, leaving the other set of cases for a
separate paper.33
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF POLITICAL PROCESS THEORY
This Part presents the story of political process theory as it is
commonly told. In Act I, the first subpart, I describe the theory's rise as
an instruction to courts to grant greater constitutional protection to the
politically powerless than the powerful. The next subpart, Act II,
explains the theory's fall. The end result under the usual telling is that
different groups receive equivalent protection from the Constitution,
regardless of their political strength.
A. Act I: Political Process Theory
For decades, the great villain of constitutional theory has been
the counter-majoritarian difficulty. 34 In addition to coining the term,
Professor Alexander Bickel described it best when he observed that,
shorn of judicial review's "mystic overtones," the reality is that "when
the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act . . . it
thwarts the will of representatives" and "exercises control, not in behalf
of the prevailing majority, but against it."35 Without some theory to
reconcile it, the Supreme Court's role as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution would seem to be in fundamental conflict with the
principles of representative government that so deeply exemplify
America's democratic innovation. 36
33. See Aaron Tang, Rethinking Political Power in Judicial Review, 106 CALIF. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018).
34. See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1014 (1984) ("The countermajoritarian difficulty proclaimed in The Least Dangerous Branch
achieved its ascendancy over the modern legal mind by expressing an opinion that, after two full
generations, had become the prevailing wisdom in both scholarly reflection and legal practice.");
Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 71 (1989)
(noting that the " 'counter-majoritarian difficulty' set the terms for the contemporary debate over
judicial review").
35. To be sure, the fundamental concerns underlying Bickel's presentation of the counter-
majoritarian difficulty predate even his seminal work, a fact Bickel himself recognized. See
BICKEL, supra note 2, at 21-22 (quoting James Bradley Thayer's 1901 book, John Marshall, for
the proposition that "the exercise of [judicial review] ... is always attended with a serious evil,
namely ... to dwarf the political capacity of the people").
36. See ELY, supra note 3, at 5:
We have as a society from the beginning, and now almost instinctively, accepted the
notion that a representative democracy must be our form of government. The very
process of adopting the Constitution was designed to be, and in some respects it was,
more democratic than any that had preceded it.
1436 [Vol. 70:5:1427
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Political process theory is one attempt to answer this dilemma.37
The seeds of the theory are first sown (in dicta) in footnote four of
Justice Stone's majority opinion in Carolene Products.38 In what is now
the most renowned footnote in all of constitutional law, Justice Stone
reserved two important questions:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities: whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 3 9
John Hart Ely's great contribution in his classic tome,
Democracy and Distrust,40 is to build a full theory of judicial review out
of these halting paragraphs and the Warren Court jurisprudence that
followed. 41 The former paragraph of the footnote gives rise to chapter 5
of Democracy and Distrust, in which Ely defends Warren Court
decisions protecting voting rights and striking down prohibitions
against political speech, both of which ensure full access to a properly
functioning democratic process.42 The latter paragraph precipitates
chapter 6, where Ely advocates aggressive judicial review for the
additional purpose of smoking out "laws directed at religious, national,
and racial minorities and [laws] infected by prejudice against them."43
This chapter responds to situations where "no matter how open the
process, those with most of the votes" still unduly "vote themselves
advantages at the expense of the others," the most striking example of
37. There are others, of course, including (most notably) originalism. The origins and
evolution of, and present debates within, originalism exceed the scope of this paper.
38. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see ELY, supra note 3,
at 75 (noting that political process theory is "foreshadowed" by footnote four).
39. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted).
40. See ELY, supra note 3.
41. I do not contend that Ely's arguments actually motivated the Court's reasoning or
outcomes. Indeed, by the time Democracy and Distrust was published, the Court had already begun
to back away from the prejudice prong. See infra notes 56, 64-67. It would be more accurate to say
that Ely's articulation of political process theory came after the cases that support it than before.
Nonetheless, this Article focuses substantially on Ely's expression of the theory in light of the
powerful influence it has had on scholarly conversations. See, e.g., Ortiz, supra note 1, at 721 ("Few,
if any, books have had the impact on constitutional theory of John Hart Ely's Democracy and
Distrust.").
42. ELY, supra note 3, at 105-25.
43. Id. at 76, 135-79.
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which is "how our society has treated its black minority (even after that
minority had gained every official attribute of access to the process)." 44
Stated in summary form, chapters 5 and 6-corresponding to
what are known now as the access and prejudice prongs, respectively-
call for judicial scrutiny when "(1) the ins are choking off the channels
of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay
out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote,
representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically
disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility . .. and thereby
deny[] that minority the protection afforded other groups by a
representative system." 45
The access prong is relatively uncontroversial and remains in
force today.46 It is Ely's prejudice prong that has drawn the most fire, 47
and which accordingly forms the focal point of this Article. For it is also
the prejudice prong that does so much of the heavy lifting when it comes
to validating many of the Supreme Court's most important decisions.
Chief among them is Brown v. Board of Education.48 As many scholars
have argued, Brown's holding cannot be easily defended on originalist
grounds, for segregated schools were the norm during and well after the
Reconstruction Era.49 Nor can Brown be rationalized under Ely's access
prong. De jure school segregation policies caused many kinds of harm,
but they did not block the channels of political change like laws
restricting the franchise or laws burdening political expression.50 The
prejudice prong, by contrast, is built precisely for cases like Brown,
where majorities prevent politically powerless minority groups from
44. Id. at 135.
45. Id. at 103.
46. See BORK, supra note 5, at 197 (observing that the access prong "poses no special
challenge to constitutional theory"); Klarman, supra note 6, at 773 ("[O]nly the prejudice prong of
political process theory ... has been shown to be unworkable.").
47. See Klarman, supra note 6, at 773; see also supra note 4.
48. 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954), supplemented by 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
49. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 1, at 252 ("Virtually nothing in the congressional debates
suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prohibit school segregation, while
contemporaneous state practices render such an interpretation fanciful; twenty-four of the thirty-
seven states then in the union either required or permitted racially segregated schools.");
Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV.
1, 59 (1955) (similar). But see Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions,
81 VA. L. REV. 947, 953 (1995) (uncovering the fact that "between one-half and two-thirds of both
houses of Congress voted in favor of school desegregation and against the principle of separate but
equal" in a number of votes shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified-historical
evidence that "constitute[s] the best available evidence of [the Amendment's] meaning").
50. But see Klarman, supra note 6, at 805-19 (arguing forcefully that Brown is defensible
under the access prong because black Americans were disfranchised throughout the South and
suggesting that, had black Americans enjoyed full political access, desegregation in the South may
have occurred organically through the democratic process).
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receiving important government benefits on fair terms, despite their
formal access to the democratic process.
And what of the counter-majoritarian difficulty? Ely's response
is as elegant as it is simple. Political process theory does not call on
judges to "dictate substantive results" in lieu of democratic majorities. 51
After all, as Ely agrees, "[i]n a representative democracy, value
determinations are to be made by our elected representatives." 52 But
there are times when our democracy is "systematically malfunctioning,"
when "the process [itself] is undeserving of trust"-in particular, when
those in power permit minorities to access the process as a technical
matter, but nevertheless act out of prejudice against them. 53 It is on
these occasions when judges should intervene to enforce the rules of the
game. Ely's theory is thus a "participation-oriented, representation-
reinforcing approach to judicial review": 54 judges should act to ensure
the integrity of the participatory processes that lie at the heart of our
nation's system of governance. Where the other theories of
constitutional interpretation fail to align the work of judges with the
democratic spirit of our charter, political process theory treats that very
spirit as the driving purpose of judicial review. What could be more
majoritarian, more democratic than that?
The early 1970s were a tidemark point for political process
theory at the Supreme Court.55 The theory's most ringing endorsement
occurred in Graham v. Richardson, a 1971 case involving state laws
preventing lawfully present noncitizens from receiving welfare
benefits. 56 The Court struck down the laws with a direct cite to Carolene
Products, explaining that "classifications based on alienage, like those
based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close
51. ELY, supra note 3, at 102-03.
52. Id. at 103.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 87.
55. There is some irony here in two respects. First, political process theory is often associated
with the Warren Court. Yet Chief Justice Warren retired in 1969; it is instead during the early
years of the Burger Court when footnote four reached the apex of its influence. Second, John Hart
Ely published Democracy and Distrust in 1980, drawing on the emergence of Carolene Products in
the 1970s. Yet by the time the book was published, political process theory was already on the
decline. See infra Section I.B.
56. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). More specifically, Graham concerned an Arizona law that required
lawfully admitted noncitizens to reside in the United States for fifteen years before receiving
benefits as well as a Pennsylvania law forbidding noncitizens from receiving welfare benefits
altogether. But see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82-83 (1976) (applying rationality review to
federal law discriminating on the basis of alienage without regard for political power concerns).
For a discussion of potential explanations for the divergent treatment of state and federal laws
burdening noncitizens, see Brian Soucek, The Return of Noncongruent Equal Protection, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 173-86 (2014).
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judicial scrutiny" because "[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a
'discrete and insular' minority . . . for whom such heightened judicial
solicitude is appropriate."5 7
The political process rationale underlying Graham is easy to
appreciate. Aliens are not permitted to vote,5 8 and so are uniquely
powerless to protect their interests in the pluralist system. And given
the stark we-they dynamic that can manifest between citizens and
noncitizens, laws depriving aliens from equal receipt of government
benefits (despite their lawful presence and their full participation in
local, state, and federal taxation) would seem to stem from a special risk
of distortion and prejudice in the democratic process, thereby
warranting active judicial intervention. Following this process-oriented
reasoning, the Court went on to strike down laws forbidding aliens to
hold competitive civil service positions,59 to be admitted to the practice
of law,60 to receive aid for higher education, 6 1 and to serve as notary
publics. 62
The Court referenced the Carolene Products framework in other
cases as well. Although it declined to hold that the elderly,63 poor, 64 and
nonnuclear-family cohabitants 65 constitute discrete and insular
minorities warranting additional protection, the salient point is that
the Court recognized in these cases that heightened scrutiny would be
appropriate for certain groups lacking the ability to protect themselves
politically-and them alone. As the Court explained in San Antonio v.
Rodriguez, a group may "command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process" if it possesses "traditional indicia of
57. Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 611 (2012) (federal law proscribing voting by noncitizens in federal
elections); ELY, supra note 3, at 161 (recognizing that "[a]liens cannot vote in any state").
59. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973).
60. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718 (1973).
61. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12 (1977).
62. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 228 (1984).
63. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) ("[OJ1d age does not define a
'discrete and insular' group ... in need of 'extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.' Instead, it marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal span."
(citation omitted)).
64. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973) ("We thus conclude
that the Texas system does not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class. . .. [This
Court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for
invoking strict scrutiny . . . ").
65. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) ("Close relatives are not a 'suspect' or 'quasi-
suspect' class.").
[Vol. 70:5:14271440
REVERSE POLITICAL PROCESS THEORY
suspectness" including, among other things, the fact that it has been
"relegated to . . . a position of political powerlessness." 66
Reflecting back on the impact of political process theory in an
address to the Columbia Law Review, Justice Lewis Powell noted that
by 1982, Carolene Products footnote four had been cited no fewer than
twenty-eight times in the Supreme Court Reporter. 67 But just as
importantly, Justice Powell pointed out that citation counts could not
express the theory's full reach, given that the theory profoundly
influenced the way the justices conceived of the Equal Protection
Clause.68 The Court, it seems, had come around to the idea that
politically powerless groups should receive special treatment under the
Constitution-treatment that would not be available to more powerful
groups burdened by similar laws. 6 9
B. Act II: Anti-Political Process Theory
Political process theory's heyday did not last long. By the 1980s,
leading thinkers from both sides of the political continuum expressed
serious concerns with the theory's ability to defeat the counter-
majoritarian difficulty. 70 And as the composition of the Supreme Court
shifted, so too did its willingness to grant special judicial solicitude to
some groups but not others due to their comparative political power.
The key to process theory's fall was in its inability to answer in
satisfactory terms the following question: Who should be entitled to
heightened protection?71 In order for the theory to circumvent the
counter-majoritarian difficulty, that question must be susceptible to an
66. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28; see also Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638 ("As a historical matter,
[nonnuclear family units] have not been subjected to discrimination; they do not exhibit obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and they are
not a minority or politically powerless.").
67. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 n.4
(1982).
68. See id. (arguing that the "influence of Footnote 4 cannot be measured accurately by simple
enumeration of cases in which it has been cited" and noting that the footnote had a "pervasive
influence" on the Court's Equal Protection doctrine).
69. Justice Powell was more circumspect. See id. at 1089 (" do not embrace [political process]
theory one hundred percent; nor do I condemn it.").
70. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
71. There were other critiques, but none more directly at odds with political process theory's
purported promise of constraining judges to a role consistent with democratic will. Thus, for
example, Professor Tribe has taken issue with Ely's claim that the Constitution is principally
concerned with process (and not substance) in the first place. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 5, at 1067.
Judge Bork has argued that the problem with granting heightened protection to some groups who
lose in the democratic process is that nothing in the Constitution specifically calls for such an
approach. BORK, supra note 5, at 197-98.
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objective, value-free answer. For if heightened constitutional protection
is to be doled out to groups based on nothing other than the personal
predilections of the unelected judges hearing a case, there is nothing
particularly democratic about process-based judicial review.
During process theory's reign, the Supreme Court's primary
approach to this puzzle was to inquire whether the group at issue had
been "relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process." 72 The Court also considered other factors, such as whether the
group suffered a history of discrimination, was the victim of
stereotyping, or shared an immutable characteristic, 7 3 but political
powerlessness was the "central process inquiry" and thus the
"quintessential process theory concern."74
Yet as critics have noted, political powerlessness is not some
simple, dichotomous concept,75 easy to discern as some objective fact. 76
That is because minorities are supposed to lack political power.77
Minority groups lose in the political process all the time, and that is
how it should be-no one thinks, for example, that our democracy has
fallen victim to some systematic malfunction when the majority
imposes a higher income tax on the wealthiest one percent, or when
legislatures enact laws punishing the few among us who like to commit
burglary.78 So what is really needed is a way of discerning which groups
are losing in the "pluralist's bazaar" for perfectly acceptable reasons
72. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); see also Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 218 (1982).
73. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-88 (1973) (affording heightened
scrutiny to women after examining the nation's history of sex discrimination, "gross, stereotyped
distinctions between the sexes," and the immutability of sex as "determined solely by the accident
of birth," in addition to the lack of political power held by women); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28 (noting
relevance of whether a group has been "subjected to ... a history of purposeful unequal
treatment").
74. See Ortiz, supra note 1, at 732-35; Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power:
Suspect Class Determinations and the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 326 (2016) (describing political
powerlessness as the "key issue within suspect class doctrine").
75. See Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV 1527, 1536-45
(2015) (noting how courts and scholars have applied at least five different and inconsistent
definitions of political powerlessness).
76. But see id. at 1594, 1598-99 (arguing that powerlessness is, in fact, objectively
ascertainable by modeling "how responsive policy outcomes are to different groups' preferences,
controlling for the groups' size and type" and finding black Americans, women, and the poor to be
politically powerless by this measure).
77. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 5, at 719 ('"To put the point simply, minorities are
supposed to lose in a democratic system-even when they want very much to win and even when
they think (as they often will) that the majority is deeply wrong in ignoring their just complaints.").
78. See ELY, supra note 3, at 154.
REVERSE POLITICAL PROCESS THEORY
and which groups are losing for reasons that, in Ely's own open-ended
words, "in some sense are discreditable." 79
The Court offered its most reasoned answer to this challenge in
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, where it described the core
of the political powerlessness inquiry as whether a group has "no ability
to attract the attention of lawmakers."s0 At a surface level, this has
some appeal: a group that cannot so much as get its voice heard in the
pluralist arena is surely one that lacks political power. The problem is,
how is one to know whether a group has been heard sufficiently by
lawmakers without some substantive, baseline conception of the
"proper" amount of attention? One could, in theory, tally up the number
of meetings a group is able to get with lawmakers, but even then how
do we know the "right" number of meetings a group ought to receive? In
the end, Cleburne's notion of powerlessness as inability to attract
lawmaker attention bottoms out on the same elemental problem: many
minority groups aren't supposed to get lawmaker attention whenever
they want it, which means we need to have an (inescapably substantive)
notion of how much is enough.
Still more troubling for process theory is the critique famously
levied by Professor Ackerman."' Even if one assumes that the Cleburne
definition of political powerlessness is a workable one, it is not clear
that discrete and insular minorities-the kind of groups most often
thought of as deserving special protection in our pluralist system, such
as black AmericanS 82-will be adjudged powerless under that metric to
begin with. That is because there are some clear advantages to being a
discrete and insular group: such groups have lower organization costs
and are less susceptible to the free rider problem precisely because they
are easily identifiable and concentrated.83 If anything, "[ilt is the
members of anonymous or diffuse groups who ... have the greatest
cause to complain that pluralist bargaining exposes them to
systematic-and undemocratic-disadvantage." 84 A judge who takes
seriously process theory's call to give special protection to the politically
79. Id. at 152.
80. 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985); see also id. at 472 n.24 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) ('The political powerlessness of a group and the immutability of its
defining trait are relevant insofar as they point to a social and cultural isolation that gives the
majority little reason to respect or be concerned with that group's interests and needs.').
81. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 724-31.
82. But see Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow and the
Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 66 (2008) (pointing out that black
Americans were actually a majority or near-majority in several states in the Jim Crow South).
83. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 724-31.
84. Id. at 737.
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powerless could thus reasonably conclude that (1) black Americans do
have sufficient power as measured by their ability to elect
representatives dedicated to their interests, and (2) it is the middle
class that actually lacks political power because that group's
diffuseness leaves it unable to block laws forcing it to pay special
subsidies to more organized and insular minorities. 85
Of course, the overriding point of this line of attack is not that
judges have picked the wrong groups for special protection, but rather
that the very act of choosing the "right" groups is all in the eye of the
(judicial) beholder. A theory of constitutional interpretation that can
permit judges to give additional scrutiny to laws afflicting the entire
middle class as plausibly as it can for laws affecting black Americans is
pretty quickly a theory beset by judicial discretion at the cost of
democratic legitimacy. That is what political process theory set out to
avoid.
Ely apparently recognized that political powerlessness as
measured by a group's ability to attract lawmaker attention cannot
serve process theory's necessary sorting function.8 6 In his view, the
better way to distinguish between groups worthy and unworthy of
heightened protection lay in social psychology. 7 "The cases where we
ought to be suspicious" of a legislative classification are "those involving
a generalization whose incidence of counter-example is significantly
higher than the legislative authority appears to have thought it was."88
This will be most often true, Ely notes, when legislators act to benefit
people like themselves to the disadvantage of those unlike themselves.89
Cases where lawmakers benefit others at their own expense, or assist
one group at the expense of another (neither of which they belong to) do
not raise similar concerns.90 Critically, Ely notes that social interaction
among different groups can reduce the risk of stereotypes. As Ely
85. See id. at 728 ("[It is precisely the diffuse character of the majority forced to pay the bill
for tariffs, agricultural subsidies, and the like, that allows strategically located Congressmen to
deliver the goods to their well-organized local constituents.").
86. See ELY, supra note 3, at 153 (arguing that the focus of process theory should "switch[]
the principal perspective .. . from the purely political to one that focuses more on the psychology
of decision").
87. Id.; see also id. at 158 ("For years social psychologists have understood ... that '[tihe
easiest idea to sell anyone is that he is better than someone else' . . . ." (quoting GORDON W.
ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 372 (1954)).
88. Id. at 157.
89. Id. at 159 ("By seizing upon the positive myths about the groups to which they belong and
the negative myths about those to which they don't ... legislators, like the rest of us, are likely to
assume too readily that not many of 'them' will be unfairly deprived, nor many of 'us' unfairly
benefitted by a classification.").
90. Id. at 159-160.
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eloquently puts it, "[t]he more we get to know people who are different
in some ways, the more we will begin to appreciate the ways in which
they are not, which is the beginning of political cooperation." 91
Yet this approach is ultimately dependent on judicial value
judgments, too. To know whether a minority group has been the victim
of improper stereotyping in the legislature, Ely argues that we need to
know whether the majority is interacting with the minority in a way
that effectively builds bonds of social empathy.92 But how do we know
if the majority is treating a minority group the way they "should"?
Without a baseline value judgment, there is little way to distinguish,
for example, among (i) a minority group comprising gun owners who are
the target of social hostility in a liberal urban center with restrictive
gun control laws, (ii) a group comprising racial minorities in an
intolerant community, (iii) a small number of individuals who wish to
start a nudist colony despite an ordinance banning public indecency,
and (iv) a religious minority that abides by a practice of plural marriage.
In each case, legislation disadvantaging the minority group could
reflect political powerlessness and thus warrant heightened scrutiny.
To Ely, the way to decide whether to grant extra protection is to make
a judgment call on which groups have been sufficiently integrated into
society to override our concern that the majority may have acted based
on improper stereotypes. In other words, Ely would have judges act as
social referees, ascertaining whether the majority is interacting
"properly" with various minorities.93 It is not hard to see how this leaves
ample room for judges' personal preferences to enter prominently into
the decisional process in any given case.
In the end, the anti-process theory consensus that emerges
among leading thinkers proves too much for our protagonist. As then-
Associate Justice Rehnquist presaged in a dissenting opinion in 1973:
It would hardly take extraordinary ingenuity for a lawyer to find 'insular and discrete'
minorities at every turn in the road. Yet, unless the Court can precisely define . .. the
terms and analysis it uses . . . the Court can choose a 'minority' it 'feels' deserves
'solicitude' and thereafter prohibit the States from classifying that 'minority' differently
from the 'majority.'
91. Id. at 161.
92. As Professor Ortiz observes, mere mixing of groups cannot be enough to build these bonds;
no two groups intermingled more than men and women, yet improper gender stereotypes "have
long resisted serious revision." Ortiz, supra note 1, at 740.
93. See id. at 741 ("Ely's two major analytical moves-from political to psychological and then
to sociological analysis-only displace the point at which substantive values flood in.").
94. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2017] 1445
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Professor Laurence Tribe (no ideological compatriot of Justice
Rehnquist) likewise argued that political process theory "sounds pretty
good-until we ask how we are supposed to distinguish such 'prejudice'
from principled, if 'wrong,' disapproval?"95 In his view,
The crux of any determination that a law unjustly discriminates against a group ... is
not that the law emerges from a flawed process .. . but that the law .. . denies those
subject to it a meaningful opportunity to realize their humanity. Necessarily, such an
approach must look beyond process to identify and proclaim fundamental substantive
rights. 9 6
And if that is so, then process theory is no salve to the counter-
majoritarian problem because it bottoms out on the need for judicial
value judgments.
The Supreme Court began to demonstrate affinity to this
critique as early as the 1970s when it refused to extend suspect class
status to new groups such as the poor and intellectually disabled. 97 And
the Court dealt its fatal blows to political process theory in a pair of
affirmative action cases where it explicitly declined to treat a racial
group's powerlessness as the touchstone for strict scrutiny, instead
viewing race as a two-way ratchet where laws burdening whites and
minorities are to be reviewed on equal terms. Thus, in Bakke, five
justices agreed that affirmative action programs in higher education
should be subject to strict scrutiny even though whites are not a
powerless minority.98 As Justice Powell observed, the political process
rationale "has never been invoked in our decisions as a prerequisite to
subjecting racial or ethnic distinctions to strict scrutiny"; racial
classifications are instead "subject to stringent examination without
regard to" a burdened group's political strength. 99 And in Croson, five
justices rejected a political process rationale for reviewing affirmative
action in government hiring under less stringent scrutiny.100 Absent
95. Tribe, supra note 5, at 1073.
96. Id. at 1077.
97. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973) (declining to afford
suspect class status to the poor); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985)
(same for the intellectually disabled).
98. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (Powell, J., joined in
relevant part by White, J.) (reviewing affirmative action program under strict scrutiny even
though the program did not burden a discrete and insular minority); id. at 361-62 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (joined by White, J., Marshall, J., and
Blackmun, J.) (stating that even in cases where race is used to advantage minorities, "our review
under the Fourteenth Amendment should be strict").
99. Id. at 290 (Powell, J.).
100. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those
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strict scrutiny into all race-based measures, Justice O'Connor
explained, "there is simply no way of determining what classifications
are 'benign'" efforts to assist a powerless group and "what
classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial
inferiority." 01
So it was that by the end of Act II, different groups would no
longer receive different constitutional protections based on their
relative political influence. 102 We now live in an era of anti-political
process theory, 103 where the politically powerless and powerful are to be
treated the same-or so the standard two-act narrative would have us
believe.
II. ACT III - REVERSE POLITICAL PROCESS THEORY
Over the past quarter century, the Supreme Court has gone
beyond treating powerless and powerful groups equivalently under the
Constitution's various open-ended provisions. In several lines of cases,
the Court has instead reversed political process theory's prescription,
extending heightened protection to groups who may reasonably be
understood as more politically powerful than others to whom the Court
has not afforded similar treatment. This Part canvasses these cases; I
return in Part IV to consider whether they might come out differently
were one to view the presence of political power as a reason to defer to
democratically enacted laws rather than the absence of such power as
a reason to strike laws down.
burdened or benefited by a particular classification."); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (same).
101. Id. at 493 (plurality opinion); see also Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134
S. Ct. 1623, 1634 (2014) (rejecting the theory that "any state action with a 'racial focus' that makes
it 'more difficult for certain racial minorities than for other groups' to 'achieve legislation that is
in their interest' [should be] subject to strict scrutiny").
102. By way of postscript, it is notable in Obergefell that the Supreme Court did not adopt the
Solicitor General's argument in favor of same-sex marriage on the ground that "[c]lassification on
the basis of sexual orientation" should be "subject to heightened equal-protection scrutiny" because
"lesbian and gay people are a minority group with limited political power." Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11-12, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1004710. Rather than reviving a political
power based approach to equal protection, Obergefell instead relied principally on the substantive
due process right to marriage. See 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
103. See Soucek, supra note 56, at 195 ("[Rlecent cases show no special concern for protecting
historically vulnerable groups of people.").
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A. General Personal Jurisdiction
Prior to 2014, it had been settled for more than sixty years that
a corporation could be subject to general personal jurisdiction in a given
forum state-that is, that the company could be sued in the forum on
claims unrelated to its activity therein-so long as the corporation had
continuous and systematic contacts with the forum. 104 In an unbroken
line, case after case and treatise after treatise repeated this rule.105
Indeed, "[t]he law was so well settled that large corporations" with
substantial contacts in forums outside their places of incorporation and
principal places of business "did not even challenge general jurisdiction"
in numerous leading cases.106
Whatever its merit, this settled rule had the clear benefit of
treating large and small businesses alike: two companies with
identically continuous and systematic contacts with a forum state were
equal before the state's courts, regardless of whether one was a
multinational, big-box retailer and the other a small, family-owned
business.
104. See infra notes 105-106 and accompanying text. General jurisdiction has also always
been permissible in a state where a corporate defendant is incorporated or has its principal place
of business. But the real issue is whether an individual plaintiff who lives in some other state
where a corporate defendant has a significant presence can bring her action against the company
in that other state-a question that can often determine whether the plaintiffs claim gets heard
at all in light of the significant costs associated with forcing the plaintiff to retain counsel and
litigate a claim across the country.
105. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (recognizing that
"continuous corporate operations within a state" may be "so substantial" as to permit suit against
a company on claims "arising from dealings entirely distinct from [its] activities"); Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952) (same); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984) (general jurisdiction permissible where
corporation engages in "continuous and systematic general business contacts" with the forum); 36
AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations § 417 (2011) (same); 16D CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM
Constitutional Law § 1937 (2005) (same). Even after the Supreme Court's 2011 holding in
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011), that general jurisdiction is
limited to places where corporations are "at home," commentators continued to agree that the
longstanding "continuous and systematic" contacts test was good law. See, e.g., 4 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067.5 (Supp. 2014)
("Goodyear ... simply reaffirms that defendants must have continuous and systematic contacts
with the forum in order to be subject to general jurisdiction.").
106. Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts: General
Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 105 (2015). Thus, for
example, Cornett and Hoffheimer point out that the manufacturers in the World-Wide Volkswagen
and Goodyear cases did not raise personal jurisdiction defenses because they assumed they would
be subject to general jurisdiction based on their extensive manufacturing and sales operations in
the forum states. Id. at 105 n.13.
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The Supreme Court made a "radical departure" from this
approach in its 2014 decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman,10 7 holding that
(outside of a company's state of incorporation and principal place of
business) corporate general jurisdiction would not be based on a
company's in-state contacts alone, but rather on an "appraisal of a
corporation's activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide."108
The bigger the company, in other words, the more likely it would be able
to escape general jurisdiction.
To fully appreciate Daimler's significance requires a brief recap
of the law that preceded it. As is familiar to first-year civil procedure
students, the Supreme Court held in the canonical 1945 case of
International Shoe that state courts may exercise power over the person
of out-of-state corporate defendants without contravening the Due
Process Clause so long as the corporation possesses sufficient contacts
with the state.109 International Shoe's contacts-based approach was
permissive, not mandatory, however, which meant that it was up to
each state to decide by legislative act just how far to go. A number of
states responded in the late 50s and 60s by enacting long-arm statutes
extending to the limits of the Due Process Clause; others enacted
statutes that permitted jurisdiction based on certain common acts
within the state, although these, too, were often construed as reaching
to the outer limit of the Due Process Clause.110
Critically, state legislatures enacted these statutes in the
immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court's 1952 decision in Perkins
v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,111 which the Court has since called
the "textbook case of general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a
foreign corporation." 112 Perkins involved a lawsuit against a Philippine
corporation brought in an Ohio state court where the underlying claim
had nothing to do with the state. The company argued that the Due
Process Clause did not permit it to be haled into Ohio court, but the
Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that the presence of the
107. Tanya J. Monestier, Where Is Home Depot "At Home'?: Daimler v. Bauman and the End
of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 236 (2014).
108. 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20 (2014). For full disclosure, I clerked at the Supreme Court during
the Term in which Daimler was issued. The opinions expressed in this Article reflect only my own
views and not those of the Court or any of its individual Justices.
109. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
110. See Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the
Limits of Due Process, 84 B.U. L. REV. 491, 497 (2004) (noting that twenty state long-arm statutes
explicitly authorize personal jurisdiction to the limits of the Due Process Clause and twelve have
been interpreted to do the same by state courts).
111. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).




company's president, corporate files, and funds in Ohio amounted to a
"continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general business" in
Ohio that was "sufficiently substantial" to permit general
jurisdiction. 113
As a consequence, when state lawmakers decided shortly after
Perkins to authorize personal jurisdiction to the full extent of the Due
Process Clause, the resulting statutes are best understood as
incorporating Perkins's holding. That is, state legislatures would have
understood their statutes to confer general jurisdiction at least over
foreign 14 businesses that, like the defendant in Perkins, carry on
"continuous and systematic" contacts in the state (such as the presence
of some corporate files, bank accounts, and high-level employees), even
if such contacts amount to only a "limited part of [the defendant's]
general business" across the country and world.115 To be sure, state
lawmakers could have chosen a more restrictive approach under which
corporations would be subject to general jurisdiction only if, for
example, the state were the company's place of incorporation or
principal place of business. But they chose not to.
The Supreme Court displaced this legislative choice in Daimler.
The case involved claims by twenty-two Argentinian residents against
the German auto manufacturer on the theory that Daimler's
Argentinian subsidiary collaborated with state security forces to kidnap
and torture certain Argentinian workers (including the plaintiffs). 116
Plaintiffs brought their suit in California federal court, and Daimler
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.1 17 Although the suit
had no connection to California, and although Daimler itself (a German
company) had little direct contact with the State, Plaintiffs argued that
the court could exercise general jurisdiction over Daimler by imputing
to Daimler the considerable California contacts of its U.S. subsidiary,
MBUSA.11 8 For its part, Daimler did not dispute that MBUSA had
sufficient contacts with California (in the form of numerous offices,
employees, and billions of dollars of vehicle sales) to warrant general
jurisdiction over MBUSA; nor did it dispute that if those contacts could
be imputed to Daimler, they would justify general jurisdiction over
113. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438, 447-48.
114. By "foreign corporation," I mean a company neither incorporated in nor having its
principal place of business in the forum state. A foreign corporation so-defined could accordingly
be incorporated elsewhere in the United States, or abroad.
115. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438.
116. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014).
117. Id. at 752.
118. Id.
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Daimler, too.119 Those concessions were unremarkable insofar as the
absolute quantum of MBUSA's California contacts far exceeded the
contacts that the corporate defendant in Perkins had with Ohio.
Daimler instead argued that MBUSA's contacts could not be attributed
to Daimler in the first place. 120
The district court agreed with Daimler, but the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that MBUSA's California contacts were attributable
to Daimler on an agency theory.121 Daimler petitioned the Supreme
Court for review of this attribution holding, and the Court granted cert
on that question.122
In its merits brief, however, Daimler raised the argument it had
conceded: that even if MBUSA's contacts were attributable to Daimler,
and even if those contacts were enough for MBUSA to be subject to
general jurisdiction in California, Daimler "would still be a German
corporation headquartered in Germany" and thus not itself subject to
general jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. 123 The import of
Daimler's argument was clear. If accepted, general jurisdiction would
no longer be based solely on the quantum of a company's absolute level
of in-state contacts, the approach taken by the Supreme Court itself in
Perkins and reflected in state long-arm statutes. Courts would instead
measure a company's in-state contacts proportionally against the
company's nationwide and worldwide business operations. 124 Under
such an approach, large foreign corporations (like Daimler) with a
pervasive presence in many forums across the United States and the
world would be free from general jurisdiction in all of them precisely
because of their extensive contacts elsewhere. 125 Smaller businesses
with more limited foreign presences would have no such luck.
119. Id. at 758; see also id. at 763 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Note that MBUSA was neither
incorporated in nor had its principal place of business in California, meaning that its contacts with
the state represented the only basis for general jurisdiction. Id. at 751.
120. Id. at 752-53.
121. Id. at 753.
122. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No.
11-965), 2012 WL 379768 (question presented is "whether it violates due process for a court to
exercise general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based solely on the fact that an
indirect corporate subsidiary performs services on behalf of the defendant in the forum State").
123. Brief for Petitioner at *31 n.5, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-965),
2013 WL 3362080; see also 134 S. Ct. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he
Court decides this case on a ground that was neither argued nor passed on below, and that Daimler
raised for the first time in a footnote to its brief.").
124. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20.
125. See id. at 760 (holding that even if MBUSA is subject to general jurisdiction in California,
the same contacts would be too "slim" for the same outcome for Daimler). A large domestic
corporation would at least be susceptible to general jurisdiction in the place of its incorporation
and principal place of business.
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The Court agreed with Daimler. Even if MBUSA's significant
California contacts could be imputed to Daimler, and even if those
contacts were enough to subject a business like MBUSA to general
jurisdiction in California, the Court reasoned, they were not sufficient
to yield the same result for a larger company like Daimler. 126 To the
extent the Court offered any first-principles defense for this ruling, it
rooted its decision in its concern that even large companies should be
subject to general jurisdiction in a small, predictable number of
states.127
To see how larger corporations are now treated more favorably
than their small business competitors, consider two different
companies. One is a family-owned business that specializes in the sale
of electronics.1 28 The company is headquartered and incorporated in
New York and operates stores in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut,
and Pennsylvania, with the vast majority of its non-New York stores
located in New Jersey. 129 The second company is Apple, headquartered
and incorporated in California. 130 Now imagine that the two companies
are the target of separate lawsuits in New Jersey court (where our
imaginary plaintiffs reside), and that each suit alleges that a company
employee tortiously harassed a customer who tried to return a defective
product. (Assume that the suit against Apple is founded on allegations
126. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760:
Even if we were to assume that MBUSA is at home in California, and further to assume
MBUSA's contacts are imputable to Daimler, there would still be no basis to subject
Daimler to general jurisdiction in California, for Daimler's slim contacts with the State
hardly render it at home there.
127. See id. at 761-62:
If Daimler's California activities sufficed to allow adjudication of this Argentina-rooted
case in California, the same global reach would presumably be available in every other
State in which MBUSA's sales are sizable. Such exorbitant exercises of all-purpose
jurisdiction would scarcely permit out-of-state defendants to structure their primary
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not
render them liable to suit.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
128. For example, P.C. Richard & Son, which is a family-owned appliance, television, and
electronics store. See, e.g., P.C. Richard & Son, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
P._C._Richard_%26_Son (last visited July 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/2H8F-SQSP].
129. See id. (listing New York corporate headquarters); Searchable New York Corporations
Database, NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, STATE RECORDS &
UCC, https://www.dos.ny.gov/corps/ (last visited July 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7NX5-DYYX]
(follow "Corporations and Business Entity Database Searches" hyperlink; then search for "P.C.
Richard & Son") (listing P.C. Richard & Son, LLC as incorporated in New York); Store Locator,
P.C. RICHARD & SON, http://www.perichard.com/storelocator/store-landing.jsp (last visited July 15,
2017) [https://perma.cc/HA7X-W6K8] (listing store locations).
130. Apple Inc., WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wikilAppleInc (last visited July 15, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/S9SR-HBFD].
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that physically took place in California and that the suit against the
family-owned business was based on allegations at a store in
Pennsylvania.) May a New Jersey court compel either defendant to
respond to the suit?
For Apple, the answer is no. 131 The suit itself has no connection
to New Jersey (because the underlying events occurred in California),
so the court cannot exercise specific jurisdiction. 13 2 And Apple can
escape general jurisdiction under Daimler given Apple's extensive
"nationwide and worldwide" presence. As Daimler holds, "[a]
corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at
home [and subject to general jurisdiction] in all of them." 1 3 3 Thus,
despite the fact that Apple has a pervasive presence in New Jersey
(including $182.8 billion in sales and twelve stores with numerous
employees), a court would hold that it is fundamentally unfair to
require Apple to defend the case in New Jersey. 134
The family-owned business, by contrast, might well be put to the
burden of defending the case in New Jersey. 135 That is because, unlike
Apple, the small business does not have a pervasive "nationwide and
worldwide" presence to offset its substantial New Jersey contacts; the
small business is instead capable of being at home both in New York
(where it is incorporated and has its headquarters) and New Jersey
(where most of its non-New York stores are located). Reflecting on this
incongruity, Justice Sotomayor lamented in her separate opinion in
Daimler that under the majority's rule, "a larger company will often be
immunized from general jurisdiction in a State on account of its
extensive contacts outside the forum," whereas "a small business will
not be."1 3 6
But that is not the only comparative advantage that large
corporations enjoy when it comes to evading suit on procedural grounds.
Large corporate defendants are also much better off than individual
defendants, a fact that may be even more troubling. In Burnham v.
131. See Gray v. Apple Inc., No. 13-CV-7798(KM)(MAH), 2016 WL 4149977, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug.
3, 2016).
132. Id. at *3.
133. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20 (2014).
134. Gray, 2016 WL 4149977, at *4 ("[T]hese business contacts, although obviously
substantial, continuous, and systematic, do not displace the ... default rule of Daimler.").
135. For support, a plaintiff could point to Daimler itself, where the Court proceeded on the
assumption that MBUSA would be "at home" in California due to its extensive presence there,
even though it was incorporated and principally based elsewhere. See 134 S. Ct. at 758 (accepting
defendants' concession throughout the litigation that MBUSA is "at home" in California, but not
accepting the same concession as to Daimler itself).
136. 134 S. Ct. at 772 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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Superior Court of California, County of Marin, the Supreme Court held
that an individual defendant is subject to general jurisdiction in a
particular forum state if she makes a single visit to the state and is
served with process while there.137 Yet where that contact would be
sufficient to justify general jurisdiction over the individual defendant,
a large corporation can evade general jurisdiction in the same state
despite a far more pervasive presence, whether measured in terms of
physical storefronts and manufacturing facilities, number of employees,
or even billions of dollars' worth of sales-as long, of course, as the
corporation is big enough to have extensive contacts across the country
and world as well. 138 To continue with our running example, this means
Apple would be able to sue our hypothetical customer (perhaps for
defamation, in retaliation for the customer's suit) in any state in the
country where the customer happens to visit so long as Apple serves
him with process there. Yet the only forum where the customer can sue
Apple is California.
B. Waiver Rules for Sovereign & Criminal Defendants
Another doctrinal area in which the Supreme Court has afforded
special protection to a powerful group that it has withheld from a
similarly situated, arguably less powerful one is with respect to the
waiver rules it has applied to sovereign and criminal defendants.
Starting with sovereign defendants, it is a "point of departure
unquestioned" that "neither a state nor the United States can be sued
as defendant in any court in this country without their consent." 13 9
States and the federal government accordingly enjoy a jurisdictional
immunity from suit, 1 40 although that immunity can be waived.141 The
critical question that often arises in cases involving government
defendants is thus whether the sovereign has in fact waived its
immunity from the suit at hand. 142
137. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
138. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 766-67 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment); Gray, 2016
WL 4149977, at *4.
139. See Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883). But see Erwin
Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (2001) (arguing that
"sovereign immunity, for government at all levels, should be eliminated by the Supreme Court").
140. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) ("Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in
nature.").
141. See John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement
Rules, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 771.
142. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238, 241 (1984) (recognizing
that a "sovereign's immunity may be waived" and examining whether "the State of California has
waived its immunity to suit in federal court"). Such a waiver typically happens through one of
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In some cases, the text of the statute in which the waiver of
sovereign immunity is allegedly found either obviously does or does not
constitute an applicable waiver. 143 In other cases, however, the relevant
statute may not be perfectly clear in either direction. The issue that
arises in these cases is how a court should go about deciding if the
statute amounts to a waiver. Should the court approach the task as it
would any other issue of statutory interpretation-that is, should it use
"traditional tools of statutory interpretation to examine markers of
congressional intent"? 144 Or should it adopt a strong presumption in the
sovereign's favor and decline to find a waiver of immunity so long as the
statute at issue may be plausibly (even if not best) interpreted that
way?
The Supreme Court has adopted the latter approach. In a long
legacy of cases, it has announced that a waiver of sovereign immunity
must be a "clear declaration" by the sovereign 45 and "strictly construed,
in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign." 146 The ultimate source
of these clear statement and strict construction rules is no mystery: the
Court has explained that they are rooted in a concern for "weighty and
constant values" of "constitutional" character. 147 The upshot of this
constitutional concern is that even where a textually ambiguous statute
is best understood in light of its context, purpose, and legislative history
to waive a sovereign's immunity, the Supreme Court will nonetheless
permit the sovereign to evade liability for the wrongs it has
committed.148
three routes: the sovereign may voluntarily waive its immunity as a unilateral act; Congress may
enact a federal statute inducing states to waive their immunity in exchange for federal funds; or
Congress may abrogate a state's immunity using its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.
See Aaron Tang, Double Immunity, 65 STAN. L. REV. 279, 290-91 (2013) (describing categories of
waivers).
143. Compare, e.g., Meyer, 510 U.S. at 480, 483 (holding that a provision of federal law
providing that the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation "shall have power ... [t]o sue
and be sued" constitutes a clear waiver of the entity's sovereign immunity), with Orff v. United
States, 545 U.S. 596, 601-02 (2005) (holding that a statute that grants consent "to join the United
States as a necessary party defendant in any suit to adjudicate" certain contractual rights does
not waive the government's immunity from suit where a plaintiff sues the United States alone).
144. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1087 (2015).
145. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 284 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996); see generally Nagle, supra note 141 (discussing
clear statement rules applicable to sovereign immunity waivers). But see Sisk, supra note 14, at
1254 (arguing that the strict construction canon for waivers of federal immunity has "fallen into
twilight" in a number of recent cases).
147. Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991).
148. Indeed, the Supreme Court has gone so far as to hold that when considering a sovereign
immunity defense, "evidence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual," which
is to say that "recourse to legislative history" is both "unnecessary" and "futile." Dellmuth v. Muth,
491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989).
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To better appreciate the significance of this approach, consider
Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Florida
Nursing Home Ass'n, which involved claims by an association of nursing
homes that the State of Florida had underpaid Medicaid
reimbursement amounts by failing to implement a cost-based payment
system in the time frame required under federal law. 149 The threshold
issue in the case was whether the State of Florida had waived its
immunity. To that point, the nursing homes pointed out that the State
had enacted a law deeming the Florida Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services-the specific state defendant in the case-a
"body corporate" with "the power . . . to sue and be sued."150 Similar "sue
and be sued" language had been found in previous cases to amount to a
clear waiver of federal sovereign immunity, and so one might have
thought the issue easily resolved in favor of the nursing homes. 15 1 For
its part, the State argued that a waiver of immunity should be found
"only where stated by the most express language," which in its view was
not present here. 152
The Court sided with the sovereign defendant. The Florida
statute did not waive the State's immunity, the Court reasoned, because
it was not sufficiently clear. 153 While the statute's concession that the
Department could "be sued" was naturally viewed as a waiver of
immunity, that waiver could plausibly be construed as extending only
to suits in state court, not federal court.154 And critically, rather than
asking whether that state-court-only interpretation was the better one
in light of the statute's text, purpose, and history (which said nothing
about the distinction between state and federal court suits), the Court
ruled for the sovereign defendant on the rationale that the statutory
waiver merely might be interpreted in its favor. 155
149. 450 U.S. 147, 148 (1981).
150. Id. (quoting FIA. STAT. § 402.34 (1979)).
151. See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 480 (1994) (discussing the Court's history of
liberally interpreting "sue-and-be-sued waivers").
152. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 450 U.S. at 150 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Id,
154. Id.
155. Id. For another example of the powerful impact of the clear statement sovereign
immunity rule, consider Dellmuth v. Muth, where the Supreme Court dismissed a suit brought by
parents of a disabled child who was forced to transfer to a private school when the public school
where he was enrolled took more than a year to review challenges to his individualized education
plan. 491 U.S. 223, 225-26 (1989). The Court refused to find a waiver of the state's immunity even
though the statute at issue, the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), was "replete with
references to the states." Id. at 232 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the Court ruled
against the parents despite conceding that the EHA's "statutory structure lends force to the
inference that the States were intended to be subject to damages actions for violations of the EHA."
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Another more recent example highlights the degree to which the
Court's special sovereign immunity waiver rule benefits government
defendants. In Sossamon v. Texas, a Texas inmate sued the State over
a prison policy that prohibited inmates from using a particular prison
chapel for religious worship. 156 The inmate alleged that this policy
violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
("RLUIPA"), which forbids substantial governmental burdens on
religious exercise unless they are "the least restrictive means of
furthering" a "compelling governmental interest."15 7 No party disputed
that Texas had waived its immunity from the inmate's suit by accepting
federal funds pursuant to RLUIPA's clear statement that "[a] person
may assert a violation of [the statute] as a claim . . . in a judicial
proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government." 15 8
Texas instead argued that it had not waived its immunity from the
particular remedy sought in the case-monetary damages-because a
second layer of its sovereign immunity was implicated. This second
layer, Texas claimed, required an additional clear statement of waiver
as to the State's immunity from monetary relief even in a suit to which
it had already consented. 159
Of course, an honest reading of the very provision of RLUIPA
that waived the State's immunity from suit also suggests that the State
waived its immunity from monetary damages. That provision
authorizes inmates not just to bring actions "against a government"
defendant, but also to "obtain appropriate relief," and it is a long-
standing presumption in American law that monetary relief is by
default the appropriate remedy unless parties specifically decide
otherwise. 160 Indeed, excluding a monetary remedy due to the absence
of an additional clear statement regarding damages would mean
presuming that Congress, by authorizing suits against states for
Id. In the Court's view, "such a permissible inference, whatever its logical force, would remain just
that: a permissible inference." Id.
156. 563 U.S. 277, 282 (2011).
157. Id. at 281 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2012)).
158. Id. at 282 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a)).
159. See Brief for the Respondents at 13, Sossamon, 563 U.S. 277 (No. 08-1438), 2010 WL
3806515:
Congress may not presume that the full panoply of judicial relief will be available in the
course of requiring a waiver from suit. On the contrary, "[t]o sustain a claim that the
Government is liable for awards of monetary damages, the waiver of sovereign
immunity must extend unambiguously to such monetary claims[.]"
(first alteration in original).
160. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1992) ("[I]t is axiomatic




"appropriate relief," actually meant only to permit suits for injunctive
relief, even though such relief is the remedial exception-and often the
more intrusive form of relief at that.1 61
Yet the Supreme Court did not find this logic persuasive. Even
though the Court agreed that it was a "plausible interpretation" to
construe the State's waiver of its immunity from suits for "appropriate
relief' as extending to ordinary claims for ordinary damages, the Court
held that the phrase "appropriate relief' was not "so free from
ambiguity that we may conclude that the states .. . have unequivocally
expressed intent to waive their sovereign immunity to suits for
damages." 162 A sovereign defendant sued for damages thus gets the
benefit of a strict construction rule not just once, but twice: the court
will dismiss a suit against the sovereign unless it has unequivocally
waived its immunity from suit, and even if such a waiver is found, the
sovereign may still avoid liability if the relevant statute does not
explicitly reference monetary damages.
So the Supreme Court has gone out of its way to grant extra
protection to sovereign defendants when deciding whether they have
waived their right to immunity. 163 But it has not done the same when
the waiver of other constitutional rights is at issue, even when those
rights are held by less powerful individuals in more high-stakes
settings.
Take the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.1 6 4
The Supreme Court explained in Miranda v. Arizona that this
"privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule" that
persons subjected to custodial interrogation must be informed that they
have the right to remain silent. 165 Yet the Court has not held that
waivers of this critical right will be subject to a strict, clear statement
rule akin to the rule for discerning whether a sovereign has waived its
immunity. Rather, "a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through
the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and
a course of conduct indicating waiver."1 66 In other words, a suspect's
161. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable
Injury, and Section 1983, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1311, 1329 (2001).
162. Sossamon, 563 U.S. at 288 (emphasis added).
163. The Supreme Court itself has characterized this immunity as a right held by sovereigns.
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 741 (1999) ("[T]he sovereign's right to assert immunity from suit
in its own courts was a principle so well established that no one conceived it would be altered by
the new Constitution.").
164. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.").
165. 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
166. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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silence-the active exercise of the very right he seeks to preserve-can
actually be an indicator that the suspect intended to waive his rights.
The Supreme Court accordingly held in Berghuis v. Thompkins that a
suspect who remained virtually silent during nearly three hours of
questioning nonetheless waived his right against self-incrimination
when he answered an officer's question. 167 The Court reasoned that
suspects who seek to avail themselves of their right against self-
incrimination should instead proactively assert that right by
"unambiguously invok[ing]" Miranda and "end[ing] the
interrogation." 168
That is exactly the opposite of the rule enjoyed by sovereign
defendants, who will be presumed to retain their right to immunity
unless they have unequivocally waived it. Illustrating the reach of this
rule, the Eighth Circuit has held in the aftermath of Berghuis that a
criminal suspect's statements to police that "Nah, I don't want to talk
man" and "No, I don't think I wanna" (in response to police asking
whether he would like to answer questions) were "not an unambiguous
invocation of [the] right to remain silent" such as would be needed to
trigger the right's protections.169
A similar approach exists in the context of a suspect's right to
counsel during police interrogation. In North Carolina v. Butler, the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected a rule under which suspects must
expressly waive their right to counsel before their statements may be
admitted against them (the analogous approach to waiver taken in the
sovereign immunity context). 170 The Eleventh Circuit has thus held
that a defendant waived his right to have counsel present during police
interrogation even though the defendant refused to sign a form waiving
his Miranda rights and asked police officers to "go ahead and run the
lawyers" before questioning.'71
167. Id. at 386-87.
168. Id. at 386. The Berghuis Court found support for an unambiguous invocation rule in its
felt need for "an objective inquiry that avoids difficulties of proof and provides guidance to officers
on how to proceed." 560 U.S. at 381 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Of course,
the strict construction rule that sovereign defendants enjoy in the immunity context is equally (or
perhaps more) objective and easy to apply-that is, the Court could have held that individual
suspects must unambiguously waive their right to silence before police can question them. The
need for a bright-line rule, in other words, cannot alone explain why the Supreme Court has
required criminal suspects to unambiguously invoke their rights, while at the same time granting
sovereign defendants immunity unless they unambiguously waive them.
169. United States v. Adams, 820 F.3d 317, 320-23 (8th Cir. 2016).
170. 441 U.S. 369, 375-76 (1979) ("[A]n explicit statement of waiver is not invariably
necessary to support a finding that the defendant waived .. .the right to counsel . . .
171. Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1132 (11th Cir. 2000).
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These cases demonstrate that even as government defendants
receive the benefit of all doubt (including in situations where a good
faith reading of the relevant statutes reveals that the government
intended to waive its immunity), criminal suspects get no such
solicitude. 172 Indeed, even suspects who try proactively to invoke their
rights-akin to a sovereign defendant passing a law that affirmatively
invokes its immunity-are routinely found to have waived them
nonetheless.173
C. Opting Out from Corporate & Union Political Speech
The general jurisdiction and sovereign immunity cases
represent the clearest examples of the Court's practice of granting
constitutional protection to groups that are reasonably regarded as
more powerful than similarly situated counterparts who have been
denied protection. But there are arguably others, too. I touch more
briefly on three candidates now, starting with unions in the aftermath
of Citizens United.
No argument concerning politically powerful groups and the
Constitution would be complete without some discussion of Citizens
United,174 a probusiness ruling that has been prominently criticized as
among the worst decisions of the current Supreme Court era. 175 The
core holding of Citizens United, though, does not implicate reverse
political process theory. That is because the principle underlying the
Court's decision to allow unlimited independent campaign expenditures
by corporations was one of equality between corporations and
172. Not every right enjoyed by the accused is subject to such a loose waiver rule. For example,
a criminal defendant may plead guilty and waive her right to trial only if the waiver is voluntary
and knowing. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). One explanation for this
divergence is that the conservative justices of the modern Supreme Court era have simply been
skeptical of Miranda's wisdom in the first place, adopting a strict waiver rule in order to
undermine that decision without directly overruling it. But the analogy to Brady itself is revealing.
In that case, the Court rooted the voluntary and knowing waiver requirement in the fact that a
defendant who pleads guilty "stands as a witness against himself," an act from which "he is
shielded by the Fifth Amendment from being compelled to do." Id. Yet that is what is at stake in
the interrogation context, too.
173. See supra notes 167, 169 and accompanying text.
174. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
175. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Is an American Hero, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept.
28, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/1 19578/ruth-bader-ginsburg-interview-retirement-
feminists-jazzercise [https://perma.cc/XZW3-IFT2H] (Justice Ginsburg names Citizens United as
the worst ruling issued by the current Court); Nick Wing, John McCain: Citizens United Is 'Worst
Decision Ever'. .. 'Money Is Money,'Not Free Speech, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 12, 2012, 9:40 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/12/john-mccain-citizens-united-n_1960996.htm1
[https://perma.cc/2FUT-RG2N] (same for Senator John McCain).
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individuals-not a desire to afford corporations additional
constitutional safeguards. 176 In that sense, Citizens United may fit most
neatly in Act II's anti-political process narrative, as a continuation of a
line of cases treating corporations on equal constitutional terms with
less powerful individuals. 177
There is, however, a subtle way in which Citizens United (in
concert with prior Supreme Court rulings) arguably did grant
corporations special constitutional treatment compared to less powerful
entities. After Citizens United, both labor unions and corporations are
able to spend unlimited general treasury funds on political
expenditures. But whereas labor unions must allow employees to opt
out from those expenditures as a matter of First Amendment law, 178
corporations are permitted to spend their funds without affording a
similar opt-out right to shareholders. 17 9 As Professor Sachs has
persuasively explained, defenses of this asymmetry on grounds of
differential state action or compulsion are tenuous at best.1 0 Thus, to
the extent unions may be understood as possessing less political
176. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (ruling that "the Government may not suppress
political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity"). Citizens United's ruling regarding
corporate campaign expenditures is not a clear instance of reverse political process theory at work
for another reason. The ruling may be best understood in terms of Ely's access prong, rather than
the prejudice prong (the subject of this Article). Under the former, intervention is warranted to
protect "the channels of political participation and communication." See ELY, supra note 3, at 76.
The arguments over Citizens United thus address whether limits on corporate expenditures
promote or frustrate political dialogue; they are not about corporations' power to protect
themselves in the political process. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court 2011 Term
Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (2012) (identifying access prong
arguments regarding Citizens United); Evan Barret Smith, Representation Reinforcement
Revisited: Citizens United and Political Process Theory, 38 VT. L. REV. 445, 446 (2013) (same). To
see the point more clearly, imagine a law forbidding political signs in the front yard of any house
worth more than one million dollars. That law would (and should) be suspect under the access
prong, notwithstanding that the affected homeowners likely have substantial power in the usual
political channels.
177. See, e.g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (holding that the
Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause applies to corporations); G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United
States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977) (rejecting claim that corporations do not possess Fourth
Amendment rights).
178. See Sachs, supra note 19 (identifying and criticizing this asymmetry); see also Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977) (recognizing an opt-out right for public
employees); Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762 (1988) (finding the same for
private employees ostensibly as a matter of statutory interpretation, but guided by First
Amendment avoidance concerns).
179. See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978) (rejecting the
analogy between compelled speech claims by dissenting employees in the union context and
shareholders in the corporate context).
180. See Sachs, supra note 19, at 827-51. Note that there is arguably greater state action in
the public employment context, since in that setting government directly requires workers to
contribute fees to a union as a condition of retaining one's job, But the private employment and
private investment contexts seem quite analogous.
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influence than corporations-a debatable proposition, 181 to be sure-
one might view this asymmetry as another instance of the Court
granting heightened judicial solicitude to more powerful entities. 182
D. Discriminatory Purpose & Equal Protection
Professor Reva Siegel has suggested another respect in which
the Supreme Court has arguably conferred greater protection upon
more powerful groups than less powerful ones: in the interaction
between the Court's approach to affirmative action policies and its
discriminatory purpose framework for reviewing facially neutral laws
with a disparate racial impact.1 8 3  More specifically, whereas
affirmative action programs burdening whites are reviewed under strict
scrutiny, facially neutral laws burdening racial minorities are reviewed
under a discriminatory purpose framework that is "extraordinarily
difficult" for plaintiffs to satisfy. 18 4
The two kinds of laws at issue are, of course, distinct in an
important way: the affirmative action policies explicitly reference race,
whereas the policies challenged under the discriminatory purpose
framework do not. That may be reason enough to reject this as an
instance of powerful entities receiving special protection, since one
could conclude that the different outcomes are driven by categorically
different kinds of laws.18 5
181. Compare Liz Kennedy & Sean McElwee, Do Corporations & Unions Face the Same Rules
for Political Spending?, DEMOS 3 fig.1 (July 23, 2014),
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/CorpExplainer.pdf [https://perma.cc/A36V-
MTW8] (noting that political spending during the 2012 election cycle by 501(c)(4) organizations,
largely comprising corporate dark money, exceeded that of labor unions by roughly eight times),
with WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 153 (1994) (finding
organized labor to possess greater ability to obtain legislative reversal of unfavorable judicial
rulings than big business).
182. A second way in which the Court arguably affords corporations special protection (albeit
of a subconstitutional nature) is through its certiorari process, where the Court grants
discretionary review in a disproportionate number of cases affecting business interests. See Lee
Epstein, William M. Landes, & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97
MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1471 (2013).
183. See Siegel, supra note 20, at 44-5 1; see also Bertrall L. Ross II, Democracy and Renewed
Distrust: Equal Protection and the Evolving Judicial Conception of Politics, 101 CALIF. L. REV.
1565, 1609 (2013) (arguing that, due to the Court's move from pluralist interest group theory to
public choice theory, the Court now shows "trust of democratic majorities' treatment of minorities"
even as it "closely scrutinize[s] laws enacted by majoritarian institutions that" burden majority
groups).
184. Siegel, supra note 20, at 3.
185. More specifically, one could believe the Equal Protection Clause instantiates an
anticlassification principle rather than an antisubordination principle, in which case the mere
mention of race in the affirmative action policies is what is driving the results in these cases. See
generally Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification
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Yet as Professor Siegel argues, the Court's "divided" approach to
equal protection is incongruous in an important sense. What drives the
Court's concern for the rights of racial majority members in the
affirmative action context is effect, not purpose: whites who are denied
a benefit receive the protection of strict scrutiny precisely because of
the material and stigmatic effects of the state's policies. 186 These
harmful effects trump the fact that the state in adopting an affirmative
action policy may well have been motivated by the perfectly benign
purpose of supporting historically disadvantaged communities.187 But
when it comes to facially neutral laws that have dire effects on racial
minorities in the form of disproportionate arrest rates, prison
sentences, and so on, the roles of effect and purpose are inverted to the
detriment of minority groups. The harmful effects of state action go out
the window, and the state will prevail simply because it will be difficult
to prove that it acted out of invidious purpose (though the same could
be said of affirmative action programs, too).188
E. Mistakes of Law in Qualified Immunity & Criminal Law
A fifth area of law that may fit within the narrative of reverse
political process theory is how the Supreme Court has treated mistake
of law arguments in the different contexts of qualified immunity and
criminal prosecution.189 The doctrine of qualified immunity "protects
government officials from liability for civil damages" even if their
conduct violated a plaintiffs constitutional or statutory rights, so long
as such conduct did not run afoul of "clearly established law."190
Qualified immunity's origins are the subject of some debate. 191 But
under one view relevant here, the defense may be said to stem from the
"doctrine of constitutional fair notice" rooted in the Due Process
Clause. 192 Holding government officials liable for actions that were not
clearly in violation of individual rights at the time of commission, the
argument goes, might contravene the due process principle that one is
entitled to fair notice of the contours of the law before being deprived of
or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003) (describing the history of, and debate between,
these two views of equal protection law).
186. Id. at 49-50.
187. Id. at 39.
188. Id. at 47.
189. I am indebted to Ryan Williams for suggesting this example.
190. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 243 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
191. See Baude, supra note 22.
192. See id. at 30-33 (noting the potential due process underpinning of qualified immunity,
but challenging its fit in light of how the doctrine is actually applied).
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their property in a civil suit.193 On this reading, individual officers are
insulated from liability for their reasonable mistakes of law by virtue of
the Due Process Clause.
This constitutional fair notice principle, however, does not apply
generally to criminal defendants who are prosecuted for violating laws
of which they were not aware. 194 The Supreme Court has accordingly
often (but not always) rejected due process defenses raised by criminal
defendants who lacked knowledge of the laws they were jailed for
violating. 195 This asymmetry is in one sense striking: whereas ignorance
of the law is a due process defense for government officers against
personal liability in a civil suit (for which the officers are frequently
indemnified by the government in any case), 196 it is not a defense in the
arguably more consequential situation where a person faces
considerable prison time.
I do not mean for this section to have canvassed the full scope of
the Court's inversion of process theory. It is possible, for instance, that
other comparable cases abound. There are also important normative
arguments that may be advanced in defense of the asymmetry in the
cases just discussed, which I will explore further below. 197
For present purposes, though, my aim is to make a modest
suggestion. Across a variety of doctrinal areas, the Supreme Court
seems to be granting constitutional protection to some groups that it is
not granting to others in substantially similar circumstances.
193. Id.
194. For thoughtful discussion of this asymmetry, see generally Barbara E. Armacost,
Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583 (1998), and Paul J. Larkin, Jr.,
Taking Mistakes Seriously, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 71 (2013).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564 (1971)
(rejecting defendant's due process argument that it could not be prosecuted for violating a federal
regulation prohibiting transportation of sulfuric acid because it lacked knowledge of the law);
United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (same for prosecution of regulation forbidding
possession of hand grenade); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922) (same for
prosecution under federal narcotics law). But see Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228-30
(1957) (reversing conviction under Los Angeles law requiring felons to register their presence
under Due Process fair notice principles).
196. See Armacost, supra note 194, at 586 n.12. Note that police officers seem to possess
substantial political influence, at least if their ability to get federal legislative support is a relevant
measure. See, e.g., Radley Balko, A New GOP Bill Would Make It Virtually Impossible to Sue the
Police, WASH. POST (May 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
watch/wp/2017/05/24/a-new-gop-bill-would-make-it-virtually-impossible-to-sue-the-
police/?utmterm=.10392cbc4537 [https://perma.cc/4JAT-Q8T5] (describing the "Back the Blue
Act" and how it would shield officers from liability).
197. See infra Part IV.
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Moreover, the category of litigants who are winning protection seems to
be, at least debatably, more politically powerful than the group of
litigants who are not. I turn next to the question of what, if anything,
we should make of this development.
III. A CRITIC'S REVIEW
What should we make of political process theory's third act? I
think two positions are worth exploring and defending, although a little
bit of background on the type of constitutional questions at issue in the
third act cases may be helpful. Section A of this Part provides that
background; Sections B and C present the different takeaways one
might draw from the preceding narrative.
A. The Interpretation-Construction Distinction
It is useful to start by clarifying two distinct moments that occur
when a judge decides a constitutional case: constitutional interpretation
and constitutional construction.198 Whereas interpretation is the act of
uncovering the semantic content, or linguistic meaning, of the relevant
text, construction is the act of identifying the text's legal effect. 199
Sometimes the act of construction does no further work, for
instance, where the text is specific enough for interpretation to dictate
directly the outcome of a case. 200 Thus, the question whether the thirty-
one-year-old LeBron James was old enough to be President of the
United States as of the 2016 election is fully answered by the
interpretive endeavor; one need only consult Article II's command that
no person is eligible to be President "who shall not have attained to the
Age of thirty five Years."2 0 1
198. The significance of this distinction has been heavily discussed and cogently explained in
the literature; my aim here is not to make any novel claims about it, but rather to tee up how it
shapes a critical analysis of political process theory's third act. See generally Solum, supra note 25
(discussing the interpretation-construction distinction); see also KEITH E. WHITIINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 5-9 (1999); Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction,
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 65 (2011).
199. Solum, supra note 25, at 100-05.
200. Note that I refer to constitutional interpretation and construction here simply because I
am concerned about the Constitution in this Article, though the same points could be made about
other sources of law, such as statutory or contract law.
201. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4; see also Solum, supra note 25, at 107 (noting that
"interpretation has already done the work" with respect to the command that "[t]he Senate of the
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state.").
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But in other cases, "the semantic content of the text constrains
but does not fully specify the legal content of constitutional doctrine." 202
That is because much of the Constitution is vague as to specific
disputes. 203 To use the cases discussed in Part II as an example, one
fully exhausts the linguistic meaning of "Due Process of Law" long
before arriving at an answer to whether and when the Constitution
permits a corporation to be haled into court in a forum that has no
connection with the suit. 20 4 The text of the Constitution is also
indeterminate with respect to whether a court should interpret waivers
of state and federal sovereign immunity as it would any other
legislative act, or whether it must instead construe all ambiguities in
the sovereign's favor. 205 The answers to these questions "cannot be
discovered in the text through more skillful application of legal tools";
judges must look to something else. 20 6
The most important observation for present purposes is that
whereas the act of interpretation is empirical, the act of construction is
inherently normative. 207 That is to say, the "something else" that judges
must rely on in constitutional construction is ultimately a normative
theory. As Professor Lawrence Solum has explained, constitutional
construction "cannot be 'value neutral' because we cannot tell whether
a construction is correct or incorrect without resort to legal norms. And
legal norms, themselves, can only be justified by some kind of normative
argument." 208 Thus, the real question is not whether judges may rely on
normative arguments when the text runs out and they are left to
construct the Constitution, but rather what normative argument(s)
they should consult.
202. Solum, supra note 25, at 108.
203. See Barnett, supra note 198, at 68-69.
204. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
205. See infra Section IV.B.2.
206. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 198, at 1.
207. See Solum, supra note 25, at 104 ("[T]heories of construction are ultimately normative
theories: because constructions go beyond linguistic meaning, the justification for a construction
must include premises that go beyond linguistic facts.").
208. Id.; see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 198, at 6 ("Something external to the text-
whether political principle, social interest, or partisan consideration-must be alloyed with it in
order for the text to have a determinate and controlling meaning within a given governing
context.").
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B. Position One: Act III Is Supported by Different, Non-Process-Based
Normative Theories
The first position one might take in response to political process
theory's third act is to defend the Supreme Court's acts of construction
by taking a catholic view of the normative values that judges may use
in deciding cases. Thus, even though the Court itself has remained
opaque as to the values underlying its sovereign immunity clear
statement rule, 209 one could justify the rule by pointing to the broader
values behind immunity itself such as separation of powers, 210 the
ability for government to function effectively by protecting its
treasury,211 and federalism (as to state sovereign immunity). 212 With
respect to general jurisdiction, one might defend the pro-big business
rule announced in Daimler by pointing to the importance of corporate
efficiency in our national economic system, 213 to the benefits of certainty
and predictability in jurisdictional rules, 2 14 or to a desire to conform
U.S. jurisdictional practices to those in foreign countries. 215 The
asymmetrical availability of opt-out rights from objectionable speech for
union workers but not corporate shareholders may be defended on the
209. See Nagle, supra note 141, at 774 ("The Court has not explained why it created such a
strong clear statement rule for waivers of federal sovereign immunity.").
210. See id. at 814-15 (observing that "[s]overeign immunity may be seen to protect the
constitutional separation of powers"); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government:
Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 521, 522 (2003)
(suggesting that sovereign immunity "may have been thought to preserve an aura of judicial
independence"); Gregory C. Sisk, The Inevitability of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 55 VILL. L. REV.
899, 900 (2010) (arguing that sovereign immunity "enhances democratic rule and fortifies the
separation of powers between the political and judicial branches").
211. See Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity's Penumbras: Common Law, "Accident,"and
Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765, 787
(2008) (noting that courts often defend sovereign immunity by reference to the "need to safeguard
the public treasury"); Ernest A. Young, Its Hour Come Round at Last? State Sovereign Immunity
and the Great State Debt Crisis of the Early Twenty-First Century, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 593,
596 (2012) (arguing that state immunity is "tied" to "protecting the fiscal health of the States").
212. See infra note 283.
213. See Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 127 (Del. 2016) (interpreting Daimler and
reasoning that "[i]n our republic, it is critical to the efficient conduct of business, and therefore to
job- and wealth-creation, that individual states not exact unreasonable tolls simply for the right
to do business"); see also John F. Preis, The Dormant Commerce Clause as a Limit on Personal
Jurisdiction, 102 IOWA L. REV. 121, 163 (2016) (arguing that because personal jurisdiction has
"significant economic consequences" through its role in plaintiffs' choice of forum, "courts should
evaluate [it] under the Dormant Commerce Clause as well as the Due Process Clause").
214. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) ("Simple jurisdictional rules ...
promote greater predictability." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010))).
215. See id. at 762-63 (noting the "transnational context of this dispute" and pointing to
European Union regulations that restrict general jurisdiction to places of incorporation and
principal places of business).
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ground that only union workers suffer cognizable harm to their freedom
of conscience because the link between shareholders and corporate
speech is too attenuated to render shareholders complicit in what
companies say. 2 1 6 And so on.
Each of these normative justifications is plausible and likely to
be persuasive to at least some reasonable minds. Thus, one takeaway
might be that, as soon as it is admitted that we are in the "construction
zone" in the Act III cases,217 the Court's constructions are all defensible
because the different normative theories underlying them are
defensible.
The trouble with this move is that it comes at the cost of the
charge that proved so successful during Act II, where leading
constitutional theorists criticized political process theory for its
inability to curtail judges to neutral principles of adjudication. 218 For
once one contends that judges should pick and choose which of any of a
multitude of background normative values are worth pursuing, there is
no persuasive, principled way to reject political process theory itself as
one of those theories. 219 Put another way, the act of defending the
constitutional constructions in Daimler and the sovereign immunity
waiver cases by reference to debatable normative theories simply
reintroduces the counter-majoritarian difficulty at a different level in
the judicial decisionmaking process.220 Judges may not sneak in their
216. James D. Nelson, Corporations, Unions, and the Illusion of Symmetry, 102 VA. L. REV.
1969, 2008-16 (2016).
217. See Solum, supra note 25, at 108.
218. See supra Section I.B.
219. To be sure, one could try to defend the normative values that underpin Daimler and (or)
the sovereign immunity cases while simultaneously advancing arguments against the use of
political process theory as a permissible source of constructive guidance. Such an undertaking is
certainly beyond the scope of this Article. The only point I wish to make here is that it is not
obvious that such a line can be convincingly drawn. Defenders of the general jurisdiction and
sovereign immunity waiver rules may point to the fact that their preferred values-for example,
national economic efficiency, separation of powers, and federalism-are strongly reflected in the
text and spirit of various constitutional provisions and structures. Yet the same can surely be said
of the value of preserving the sanctity of the political process. See ELY, supra note 3, at 87 (arguing
that the Constitution's provisions are "overwhelmingly concerned" both with "procedural fairness
in the resolution of individual disputes" as well as with "ensuring broad participation in the
processes and distributions of government"). But see Michael C. Dorf, The Coherentism of
Democracy and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1237, 1246 (2005) (arguing, counter to Ely's reading of the
Constitution, that "democratic participation as an interpretive tiber-principle cannot be derived
from the Constitution's text and structure standing alone").
220. See Nagle, supra note 141, at 808 ("[J]udicial selection and enforcement of the favorite
values of the judiciary" through clear statement rules "is countermajoritarian."); cf. Michael B.
Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme
Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 819, 820 (1999) ("Moreover,
if federalism decisions are permitted to violate textualist principles, but decisions in other areas
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policy preferences through contested historical arguments or subjective
judgments as to which groups lack sufficient political power, but they
may wind up in the same place through their choice of normative
theories that inform the process of constitutional construction.
One reaction to this dilemma is that this is the best we can do-
perhaps debates among justices over which background normative
theories to pursue is an inescapable (or even laudable) part of our
constitutional design.221 Yet not every theory of constitutional
construction is similarly situated; "[t]he claim that theories of
constitutional construction must be normative does not imply that
judges who engage in constitutional construction must resort to their
own beliefs about morality or politics in particular cases." 2 2 2 For
instance, a normative theory rooted in the rule of law virtues of
deference to decisions made by democratic bodies would take judges'
personal views substantially out of the equation.223
That, of course, is not the theory the Supreme Court has followed
in the general jurisdiction, waiver, and other cases; those decisions are
instead distinctly counter-majoritarian. The crux of the first response
to political process theory's third act is thus to place the outcomes
reached in those cases (and the various values that undergird them) on
a higher plane than the desire to abide by the will of democratic
majorities.
C. Position Two: The Act III Cases Violate "Reverse" Political Process
Theory
Alternatively, one could take the position that the concern for
neutral principles of adjudication that prevailed during political process
theory's downfall in Act II is an equally persuasive basis for attacking
the Court's Act III decisions. On this view, the proper response to the
inevitable need for constitutional construction is not to throw one's
hands up and concede that any normative theory will do in the
construction zone, but rather to identify normative theories that are
themselves sensitive to the counter-majoritarian difficulty.
are not, then the federalism cases may come to be viewed as illegitimate decisions that derive from
the political preferences of the justices rather than the Constitution.").
221. See Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original Public Meaning, 31 CONST. COMMENT.
71, 92 (2016) ("Constitutional construction is a matter of judgment; it uses all available modalities
of argument as sources of wisdom or insight about how to continue the constitutional enterprise
in the present.").
222. Solum, supra note 25, at 105 (emphasis omitted).
223. See id. at 105-06; see also, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
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One such theory would be to focus on the political process,
although not in the way political process theory is typically expressed.
Rather than serving as a positive principle that demands additional
constitutional protection for the politically powerless, the theory could
be recast as a negative command: judges should not second-guess the
choices of the political branches when the groups burdened by those
choices are capable of protecting themselves. 224 The right response to
the third act in the story of political process theory, in other words,
might be to reverse the theory's prescription into an ought-not, rather
than an ought.
Why might this approach be normatively attractive? A fuller
defense is the burden of another paper,225 but a thumbnail sketch is
warranted now. The core idea is that the very concern for democracy
that underpinned the counter-majoritarian critique and the fall of
political process theory in Act II should counsel judges to be cautious
before striking down laws burdening powerful groups on the basis of
underdetermined constitutional text and contestable normative values.
Indeed, to the extent the losers in the democratic process in the Act III
cases-large corporations, sovereign and individual officer defendants,
and members of the racial majority-are capable of defending their own
interests before Congress and statehouses, there is no strong reason to
privilege a judicially constructed outcome over the outcome of the
democratic process. If anything, calls for letting the political process
work itself out are especially persuasive in this context. For rather than
forever removing a policy question from a legislature's purview on the
basis of underspecified constitutional text and history, reverse political
process theory would require judges to leave the matter for debate in
the political sphere, trusting that the powerful group that lost this time
around may yet prevail in the future.
224. This negative command is notably different from the school of argument that legislation
benefiting powerful groups ought to be construed, when ambiguous, against such groups. See infra
note 300; see also Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and
Balances, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 419, 487-90 (2015) (suggesting greater judicial solicitude for less
wealthy groups during review of executive action). Such arguments reflect Ely's basic premise that
aggressive judicial action may be warranted to protect powerless groups, albeit imported from the
constitutional to the statutory and administrative law domains. Professor Ganesh Sitaraman has
identified a related point in his important work on economic power and constitutional law, where
he suggests, among other things, a more aggressive form of judicial review when legislation harms
diffuse majorities of middle-class Americans to the benefit of the economically powerful. See
Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional Theory, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1514-16 (2016). My focus is instead on when judicial deference is especially
justified, namely when politically powerful entities seek to challenge on constitutional grounds a
policy outcome they were fully capable of fighting in the democratic process-in particular when
the Supreme Court has refused similar intervention on behalf of less powerful groups.
225. See Tang, supra note 33.
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An idea is one thing, but implementation is another. So how
might the theory be carried into operation by courts? This question
implicates two subspecies of concern, one about weight and another
about scope. How much weight should the presence of political power
bear when it runs into tension with other normative values in the
course of constitutional construction? And to what scope of cases should
reverse political process theory even apply?
Taking the weight question first, there are two kinds of
approaches a court might take. 22 6 One would be to use reverse political
process theory as an overriding, threshold trigger for deference to the
actions of the political branches. Under that approach, if a group
seeking recourse from legislative defeat under some underdetermined
constitutional provision is deemed politically powerful, the court would
automatically decline to intervene on the group's behalf without
consulting other normative considerations. 227
A second way would be for courts to treat a finding of political
powerfulness more modestly, as just one legitimate modality courts
may consult when they construct answers to difficult constitutional
questions left unanswered by our founding document. 228 If the group
seeking constitutional redress from legislative defeat is politically
powerful, in other words, that would place a thumb on the scale in favor
of upholding the law. But other normative values could tip the scale in
the other direction. Thus, rather than treating political power as a first-
order consideration demanding deference to legislative action, a court
taking the more modest approach would treat political strength as just
one factor among many in the process of constitutional construction.
The latter, more measured role for a finding of political power is
tempting and easier to justify, although it has the tradeoff of leaving
more discretion to judges in the course of weighing competing values.
226. This is oversimplified for the sake of expositional clarity. A court could attach a weight
to reverse political process theory that runs along something of a spectrum-from threshold
inquiry, to one factor among many, to last-case factor to consider when all else runs out. I
acknowledge these different positions while maintaining that the two approaches discussed at
greater length are the most promising to consider.
227. This approach shares some theoretical roots with an approach Professor Larry Solum
has described as "Originalist Thayerianism." See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and
Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 472-73 (2013). Under Originalist
Thayerianism, courts confronting underdetermined constitutional provisions should "defer to the
decisions made by the political branches." Id. at 473. My approach would counsel similar deference
to the political branches in cases where the class of entities burdened by a law is politically
powerful. By contrast, challenges against laws burdening nonpowerful entities would be resolved
by recourse to other normative values that are typically used in the process of constitutional
construction. See Balkin, supra note 221.
228. See Balkin, supra note 221 (discussing methods of construction).
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Ultimately, however, one's view on how much weight to attach to
reverse political process theory as a normative frame of decision for
judges may turn in part on the second application question I've flagged:
the scope of cases to which the theory should apply to begin with.
There are many situations where courts consider constitutional
challenges to action by the political branches brought by ostensibly
powerful litigants. Must a court make a (contested!) judgment about
political strength in every such case? This startling possibility brings to
the foreground the need to clear away a substantial set of cases when
reverse political process theory should not apply: cases where the
specific litigant in court may be politically powerful, but the
constitutional rule the litigant advocates is generally applicable to
persons or entities across the spectrum of political power. Thus, for
example, a court should not reject a race-based Equal Protection
challenge brought by a politically influential member of a racial
minority simply because that person happens to be individually quite
powerful; reverse political process theory (like political process theory
itself) is a theory about when the groups affected by democratic action
are able to defend their interests politically in the aggregate. Likewise,
a court should not decline to apply reverse political process theory
simply because an individual litigant in court lacks power where the
litigant belongs to a group that is influential in the aggregate. To use
one of the Act III cases to illustrate, political power would matter in the
general personal jurisdiction context even if the specific corporate
defendant at issue was not Daimler, but a. struggling multinational
company currently in bankruptcy proceedings that has ceased making
political expenditures.
But another problem of scope remains: Should judges factor
political power into their decisionmaking anytime a law may be said to
burden a group that, in the aggregate, possesses arguably outsized
political strength? The obvious trouble with such a broad scope of
application is that it puts immense pressure on the ability of courts to
correctly ascertain what groups are politically powerful and what
groups are not. That, in turn, points up the strongest counterargument
to reversing political process theory's core command: the fact that using
political power as a reason to defer to democratically enacted laws is
not free of judicial value judgments either. After all, to know if a group
is politically powerful, a judge has to make some substantive judgment
of what political power is and who has enough of it-a judgment that is
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irreducibly substantive and value-laden. 229 And if that is so, then
reverse political process theory may not be free from counter-
majoritarian critiques either.
This concern, I submit, is not so worrisome-at least when one
limits the application of reverse political process theory to the kinds of
situations canvassed in this Article, where the Supreme Court has
considered claims for constitutional protection by two (or more) groups
and where it has decided to grant relief only to the relatively more
powerful group. 230 To see why, look at what actually turns on the
political power judgment under the doctrine of reverse political process
theory. Whether under the weaker one-factor-among-many approach,
or the stronger threshold approach, a judicial determination that the
group burdened by a given law possesses enough power to defend its
own interests merely points to a posture of deference to the elected
bodies that adopted the law. The substantive judgment called for is thus
just a stepping stone to greater respect for majoritarian will, not a
launching pad for judicial policy preferences.
To play out the logic further, suppose that a judge decides to
apply reverse political process theory in a given constitutional case, yet
gets the political power determination wrong (whether due to personal
bias or not). If the judge mistakenly identifies the burdened group as
powerful even though it is actually powerless (i.e., a false positive),
there is no harm to democratic will because the net result of the mistake
is just to defer to the legislature's judgment. 231
Or perhaps the judge gets it wrong in the other direction,
concluding that a group is politically powerless when in actuality it is
able to protect its interests adequately (i.e., a false negative). Unlike in
the usual version of political process theory, where that mistake would
lead to aggressive judicial intervention into policies adopted through
the majoritarian process, 232 a finding of powerlessness in process
theory's more modest version triggers no special scrutiny of
majoritarian laws at all. Instead, it simply removes one factor-the
presence of political strength-from a judge's decisionmaking calculus,
leaving the judge to decide whether reversal of the legislature's policy
229. See supra Section IB; see also Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public
Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 119 (2016) (describing the difficulty with making the "motivating
determination that some group has 'too much' power").
230. See supra Part II.
231. The same would be true of political process theory as it is traditionally understood.
232. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974) ("[W]here legislation affects
discrete and insular minorities, the presumption of constitutionality fades because traditional
political processes may have broken down." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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choice on constitutional grounds may be warranted for some other
reason. Thus, for example, a judge would need to identify a
constitutional history indicative of special protection for the burdened
group, 233 a desire to respect precedent (which in turn produces benefits
for the judiciary's institutional credibility), 2 3 4 or other background
constitutional values discussed earlier.235 If the judge goes on to strike
down the law, it will be those other values-not any finding with respect
to political power-that do the legwork.
At this point, it is fair to wonder whether we are just back in the
same dilemma described in the previous section, 236 where judges are
free to reach their preferred policy outcomes by consulting any of a
number of contested normative theories. But the important difference
is that we only arrive at this state of affairs if a judge makes an initial
category error with respect to the burdened group's political strength.
Judges will be unlikely to err in this direction, I submit, once one
recalls the cases I've described in Act III. How much political power is
"enough" for a group to defend its own interests adequately may be
difficult to ascertain on an absolute basis, at least without relying on
value-ridden judgments. 237 But political power is much more
susceptible to empirical determination as a relative concept-a point
Professor Nick Stephanopoulos has demonstrated quite convincingly
through his ground-breaking work measuring the relative political
influence of various subgroups based on extensive survey data.238
Accordingly, when a court confronts a request for constitutional
protection by a group that is more politically powerful than a
comparable group to which the Court has previously denied the same
protection, the risk of a biased, subjective determination of political
power is substantially mitigated.239
233. See, e.g., Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754 (1985) ("From the closing days of the Civil War until the end
of civilian Reconstruction some five years later, Congress adopted a series of social welfare
programs whose benefits were expressly limited to blacks.").
234. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723, 752 (1988) ("A general judicial adherence to constitutional precedent supports
a consensus about the rule of law, specifically the belief that all organs of government, including
the Court, are bound by the law."); see generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 41-
45 (2010) (discussing virtues of a precedent-based, common-law approach to the Constitution).
235. See supra Section III.B.
236. See supra Section III.B.
237. See supra Section I.B.
238. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 75, at 1572 (explaining how statistical analysis of large
datasets containing information about individuals' policy preferences can reveal whether certain
groups are "relatively powerless" when compared with similar counterparts).
239. There will assuredly be some instances in which a comparison of two groups' political
strength may not reveal a clear advantage in either direction. See, e.g., Section III.C (discussing
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There are other possible answers to the legitimate concern that
political power may be too difficult for judges to measure in an objective,
value-free manner. For example, one could vary the answer to the
question of how much weight to attach to the theory based on how
demonstrable political power is in different categories of cases. Thus,
the stronger threshold approach to a political power finding might be
appropriate in cases where the Supreme Court has previously withheld
constitutional protection from a similarly situated, less powerful group.
By contrast, treating political power as one factor among many-i.e., as
a reason to rule against the powerful challengers to a law that is
defeasible in light of other normative values, such as a concern for
precedent or particular consequences-may be more appropriate in
cases where there is no less powerful comparator to use as a
guidepost. 240
Finally, courts could adopt a closure rule to deal with cases
where a group is not susceptible to easy identification as powerful or
powerless. 241 Under that approach, in cases where there is strong
evidence that a group possesses political power, that will count as a
reason to defer to the challenged law. But in close cases, the court would
throw political power considerations out the window and decide the
matter based on the other normative values that are already used to
resolve hard cases-the same approach the court would take if the
group at issue were clearly powerless. 24 2
The critical point is that when judges are asked to strike down
democratically enacted laws under vague constitutional provisions that
supply no ready answer, our confidence in whether the democratic
process can be trusted to work should count for something. Just how
much is a reasonable question to ask. But surely the process can be
disparate treatment of unions and corporations under the First Amendment). But so long as the
Court has denied constitutional protection to some group of at least similar political strength, it
would be incongruous to grant the same protection to another. More fundamentally, the need for
such line drawing does not turn an intrinsically pro-democratic theory into a counter-majoritarian
one. Professor Thayer, for example, famously argued that a judge should only strike down a law
"when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a
very clear one, - so clear that it is not open to rational question." Thayer, supra note 223, at 144.
Judges can make mistakes in the course of applying that rule, too-for instance finding a "clear"
constitutional violation when in fact the violation is open to debate. Yet Thayer's approach remains
manifestly majoritarian, for its default position is for judges to trust the work of elected officials.
Just so for political process theory's negative command, which can be thought of as a special call
for deference when the group seeking relief from political defeat is more powerful than another
group to which the Court has already denied protection.
240. I make this argument in separate work. See Tang, supra note 33.
241. For a discussion of the concept of "closure rules" generally, see William Baude & Stephen
E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1110-11 (2017).
242. See supra Section III.B.
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understood as functioning more smoothly when the groups that have
the greatest access to lawmakers (and often win as a result) nonetheless
come out on bottom in a given instance. Judges should not blind
themselves to that reality.
As the preceding paragraphs suggest, my own inclination is that
the second response to the most recent Act of political process theory is
more persuasive than the first. The same criticisms that convinced the
Court to get out of the business of conferring extra protection upon
politically powerless groups should convince the Court to do the same
with respect to groups that happen to be politically powerful.
One possible virtue of refraining political process theory as a
negative command is its ability to attract something of an overlapping
consensus. 243 Critics of political process theory who are motivated by a
concern over the convergence between unelected judges' policy
preferences and the outcomes of constitutional construction should
agree with the theory once it is refrained as a negative command
against special judicial solicitude for the powerful (just as they would
for the powerless). 244 And although proponents of political process
theory might prefer to see the theory's positive vision put into effect,
they should agree at a minimum that once that vision is rejected,245 the
powerful should not receive special judicial protection that has been
denied to the powerless.
None of this is to imply, of course, that no other normative theory
may be used when constructing the Constitution. There is often no way
to avoid hard value judgments when the constitutional text has run out;
evidence regarding original applications, 2 4 6 historical practice, 247
precedent, 248 and other values may well all come into play.249 The lesson
of political process theory's third act, however, is this: there should be
243. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 340 (1971).
244. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV.
1935, 1952 (suggesting that, to the extent originalists are motivated by "a distrust of the
institutional capacity of judges to make objective morally-correct decisions, then the[ir] theory of
constitutional construction would do well to avoid a reliance on the judges' own beliefs about
political morality").
245. See supra Section LB.
246. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559, 2562-64 (2014) (giving
"significant weight" to historical practice when interpreting the Recess Appointments Clause).
248. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
249. See supra Section II.B.
1476 [Vol. 70:5:1427
REVERSE POLITICAL PROCESS THEORY
no need for unelected judges to turn to these contested value judgments
in the first place when the ones asking the judiciary to invalidate the
fruits of the democratic process are powerful groups seeking
constitutional protections that the Court has already denied the less
powerful.
IV. APPLYING REVERSE POLITICAL PROCESS THEORY
How might the cases described in Act III come out if the
Supreme Court were to treat political power as a reason to defer to
democratically enacted laws? I take up that thought exercise presently.
In doing so, two types of arguments emerge as the strongest reasons to
think the Court may have gotten the Act III cases right after all. First,
for some of the cases, there is a plausible argument that the group that
I've implied is politically powerful may actually be less so than the
counterpart whom the Court has denied protection. And second, there
is an argument that some of the pairwise comparisons I have offered
are not entirely fitting, such that categorical differences between the
underlying constitutional issues may account for the divergence in
outcomes, political power notwithstanding.
A. General Jurisdiction
Should large, multinational corporations have comparably
greater ability to evade general jurisdiction in a given forum state than
small business or individual defendants? It goes almost without saying
that the Constitution does not answer this question outright on any
textualist or originalist account; the Due Process Clause tells us
precious little about when a foreign company may be haled into court
on claims unrelated to the forum (much less whether a company's in-
state contacts should be judged on an absolute or proportional basis). 250
That means a judicial resolution under the aegis of the Due Process
Clause must come, if at all, through constitutional construction.
250. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-
Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241, 258 (noting that "American courts received no helpful
common-law heritage" with respect to "territorial jurisdiction among the states"). In fact, to the
extent originalism would point in any direction, it seems likely that it would counsel against
Daimler's restrictive approach. By the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, "courts had
already been engaged in several decades of expansion of jurisdiction over out of state corporations,"
including by considering a corporation to be "present" in a state if it "conducted a sufficient amount
of business" in the state. Cody J. Jacobs, If Corporations Are People, Why Can't They Play Tag?, 46
N.M. L. REV. 1, 13 (2016).
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If the Court had used reverse political process theory as a tool of
construction, it likely would have rejected Daimler's request to rewrite
the decades of general jurisdiction law ensconced in state long-arm
statutes. On virtually any account, large corporations are more
powerful than small business and individual defendants, and there is
no argument that the two situations are inapt comparisons. All of these
cases, after all, are about the same constitutional rule: whether and
when the Due Process Clause shields a defendant from suit in a forum
for unrelated conduct.
The best arguments to the contrary challenge whether large
corporations actually possess outsized political influence. There are two
plausible arguments that the answer may be "no." First, perhaps
Daimler's rule is aimed at protecting foreign corporations (as in, those
incorporated and with their headquarters outside the United StateS 251)
from the ill effects of jurisdictional statutes enacted by Congress and
state legislative bodies that, as a structural matter, restrict foreign
companies from participating in their political processes. Federal law,
after all, prohibits foreign corporations from making contributions in
connection with any federal, state, or local election, 252 so one might
argue that the democratic process is "malfunctioning" in the sense that
long-arm statutes are enacted by domestic lawmakers whom foreign
companies are forbidden to influence. On this view, foreign corporations
might be seen as similarly situated to lawfully present noncitizens, a
group deemed sufficiently powerless by the Court to receive heightened
scrutiny in the 70s. 2 5 3 Neither group can vote, 254 and foreign companies
might even be less powerful in that lawfully present noncitizens can at
least make campaign contributions. 2 5 5
The trouble with this argument is that it misses the critical way
in which corporations actually influence lawmakers: through
251. Cf. supra note 114 and accompanying text.
252. See 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2012). Congress has a role in that it has ultimate authority to
approve the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which set the limits of federal court jurisdiction. See
FED. R. CIv. P. 4(k)(1) (providing, as relevant, that service or a waiver of service establishes
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is subject to the same in the state where the district
court is located). Thus, foreign corporations could complain that they are prohibited from
advocating their interests before Congress with respect to personal jurisdiction as exercised by
federal courts. The argument as to state legislative bodies is more direct: foreign corporations may
argue that they are forbidden to lobby or influence state lawmakers in an effort to enact more
restrictive long-arm statutes.
253. See supra notes 56-62.
254. Supra note 58.
255. See 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b)(2) (2012) (defining "foreign nationals"-who are prohibited from
making campaign contributions-to exclude persons who are lawfully admitted for permanent
residence).
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independent expenditures, not campaign donations. In the aftermath of
Citizens United, where corporations are no longer prohibited from
making direct expenditures to influence elections, 256 foreign
multinational corporations can use their U.S. subsidiaries to channel
unlimited funds to super-PACs and other entities dedicated to
electioneering, incurring the favor of their preferred lawmakers in the
process. 25 7 It has accordingly become commonplace for foreign
corporations to spend vast sums of money on their preferred political
causes, oftentimes avoiding public disclosure laws in the process by
channeling money through IRS-recognized 501(c)(6) trade associations
and 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations. 2 5 8 As one commentator notes,
trade associations like the American Petroleum Institute-an
organization influenced significantly by the Saudi Arabian oil company,
Aramco-can now "cloak multinational and even foreign corporate
election spending under an American flag."25 9
Moreover, even if there were a legitimate concern that foreign
companies are structurally unable to participate adequately in U.S.
elections through the just-described means, that argument would not
prove enough. Daimler's pro-big business rule does not apply only to
foreign corporations, but also to U.S. companies doing business across
the fifty states.260 While federal law and twenty-two states do prohibit
U.S. corporations from direct contributions to federal and state political
campaigns, respectively, the other states permit corporations to give
money to state campaigns-six states even allow corporations to give
an unlimited amount of money to state campaigns. 261 In a majority of
256. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010).
257. See Corey R. Sparks, Note, Foreigners United: Foreign Influence in American Elections
After Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 245, 252 (2014)
(explaining how foreign corporations can "contribute money to organizations that are permitted to
influence elections"); Explainer: Can Foreign Companies Make Political Donations?, IT'S A FREE
COUNTRY (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.wnyc.org/story/181667-explainer-can-foreign-companies-
make-political-donations/ [https://perma.cc/SE57-ZK5W] (describing how foreign corporations use
their U.S. subsidiaries to "form PACs and spend money on campaigns").
258. Sparks, supra note 257, at 253-54; see also Lee Fang, Never Mind Super PACs: How Big
Business Is Buying the Election, NATION (Aug. 29, 2012) https://www.thenation.comlarticle/never-
mind-super-pacs-how-big-business-buying-election/ [https://perma.cc/7V6A-XC64] (describing
ability of foreign corporations to channel secret dollars into U.S. elections through 501(c)(6) trade
associations, which are not required to disclose their donors).
259. Fang, supra note 258.
260. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 773 n.12 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring
in the judgment) ("[T]he principle announced by the majority would apply equally to preclude
general jurisdiction over a U.S. company that is incorporated and has its principal place of business
in another U.S. State."); see also supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text.
261. See 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2012) (banning corporate contributions in federal elections); Brian




states, in other words, large U.S. companies have at least as much
influence over lawmakers as ordinary citizens. And even in the other
states, it remains the case that all U.S. companies can spend unlimited
amounts on direct campaign expenditures after Citizens United.
But it might be said that these domestically incorporated large
corporations suffer a different kind of political power deficit. Some state
and local government constituencies may harbor pro-local-business
attitudes, which manifest in opposition to large corporations. 2 6 2 That
opposition may come in various forms, such as bills targeting large
companies for special adverse treatment-think Maryland's "Walmart
Tax" on companies with more than ten thousand workers who do not
pay eight percent of their payrolls on employee health insurance costs-
or unusually harsh jury verdicts in civil litigation. 263 And so the
Supreme Court's decision in Daimler might be understood as an
attempt to correct for this political power deficit, ensuring that local
citizens cannot impose special costs on large companies incorporated in
other states out of pure social hostility.
There are several responses to this argument. One is that the
hostility held by certain segments of the population against large
corporations itself stems from the view that lawmakers are in the
pockets of big business. 2 6 4 Social hostility against big business is thus a
response to outsized corporate influence over the political process in the
first place, with the goal being not to end big business altogether, but
to force big business to participate and compete on equal terms. 265
overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/44H9-AKSK] (describing state laws regarding corporate
contributions to state elections).
262. One might contend that political process theory should be limited to benefitting groups
of people, not entities, who are the subject of social prejudice. Entities (like corporate and sovereign
defendants), however, are just the aggregations of the interests of individuals, and so there is no
theoretical reason to draw a line between the two.
263. For a discussion of Maryland's Walmart Tax, which (perhaps indicative of the political
influence held by large corporations) was ultimately struck down on federal preemption grounds,
see Retail Industry Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007), and Kathlynn Butler
Polvino et. al., ERISA as an Obstacle to Fair Share Legislation and Other State Initiatives to
Expand Coverage to the Uninsured and Underinsured, 1 J. HEALTH & LIFE SC. L. 99, 101 (2007).
I thank Stephen Sachs for pointing out this helpful example.
264. See, e.g., Tim Hains, Trump Reaches Out to Sanders Supporters, REALCLEARPOLITICS
(June 22, 2016), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2016/06/22/trump-reaches-outto_
sanders-supportersletsfixamericas riggedsystem together.html [https://perma.cc/E7FD-
RYD6] ("[Tihe whole economy [is] rigged by big businesses who want to leave our country, fire our
workers, and sell their products back into the U.S. with absolutely no consequences . . . .").
265. See, e.g., Bernie Sanders on Corporate Regulation, FEEL THE BERN, http://feelthebern.org/
bernie-sanders-on-corporate-regulation/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2017) [https://perma.cc/EGL4-
R5V6] ("Bernie Sanders believes we cannot continue to allow our nation's wealthiest corporations
to avoid paying their fair share of taxes.").
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Moreover, the evidence regarding corporate influence in politics
is overwhelming. By virtually any account, big business has more
political power than small business, and certainly more power than the
diffuse grouping of individual defendants. To start, there is no dispute
that large corporations spend an enormous amount on lobbying and
other political expenditures. For instance, a 2014 report showed that
between 2007 and 2012, "two hundred of America's most politically
active corporations spent a combined $5.8 billion on federal lobbying
and campaign contributions." 266 The impact of such spending is equally
clear. The same report found that the $5.8 billion in lobbying and
campaign spending netted those corporations a staggering $4.4 trillion
in federal contracts and subsidies.267
At the state level, a 2015 taxpayer watchdog report found after
examining more than 4,200 state economic incentive programs that "big
businesses overall were awarded ninety percent of the dollars," even
though the programs were supposed to be "equally accessible to small"
companies. 268 An earlier report from the same organization found that
$110 billion worth of state and local incentive deals over a three-year-
period-seventy-five percent of the total dollar value of all such deals
in the relevant database-went to a select group of global parent
companies. 269 It is awfully difficult to conclude that large corporations,
which receive tens of billions of dollars in state and local tax subsidies
each year, are politically powerless before those same units of
government simply because one state passed a tax aimed at making
Walmart pay more in health insurance for its employees (or because
some local juries may harbor pro-local attitudes). Indeed, recent media
coverage has revealed an important pathway through which large
corporate interests are uniquely able to efficiently and effectively
influence state legislation: the conservative American Legislative
266. Bill Allison & Sarah Harkins, Fixed Fortunes: Biggest Corporate Political Interests Spend
Billions, Get Trillions, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Nov. 17, 2014, 9:26 AM),
https://sunlightfoundation.com/2014/11/17/fixed-fortunes-biggest-corporate-political-interests-
spend-billions-get-trillions/ [https://perma.cc/8359-8QTC].
267. Id.; see also Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 574-75 (2014) (identifying
influence advantage enjoyed by business interest groups compared to non-economic-elite
individuals and nonbusiness interest groups).
268. Greg LeRoy, et al., Shortchanging Small Business: How Big Businesses Dominate State
Economic Development Incentives, GOOD JOBS FIRST 3 (Oct. 2015), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/
sites/default/files/docs/pdf/shortchanging.pdf [https://perma.cc/GTR5-Y686].
269. Philip Matera, Subsidizing the Corporate One Percent, GOOD JOBS FIRST, 1 (Feb. 2014),
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/does/pdf/subsidizingthecorporateonepercent.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q6M3-6H8Y]. For a general discussion of big business's political power, see
Andrias, supra note 224, at 440-42.
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Exchange Council ("ALEC"), which drafts model probusiness legislation
for introduction in statehouses across the nation.270 ALEC claims, for
example, to produce model legislation leading to more than one
thousand bills introduced in states each year, with seventeen percent
of them passing.271
In the end, then, asking whether local or state constituencies are
sometimes able to coalesce around laws that disadvantage large
corporate interests is not the right question. In our political system, no
group is immune from occasional losses, and corporations are no
different. What judges need to know for purposes of deciding whether
to defer to state long-arm statutes that ratified a more expansive
version of general jurisdiction over large corporations is whether that
group of entities is less powerful than small business and individual
defendants, all else equal. The evidence of large corporations' success in
state and federal policy just given strongly suggests that the answer is
no.
And that, in turn, provokes the following question: Why did the
Supreme Court feel the need to second-guess the legislative
determinations of state lawmakers who, after Perkins was decided in
1952, decided to embrace a broad view of general jurisdiction in their
various long-arm statutes? Big business was perfectly free to articulate
its economic disagreements with Perkins's approach to general
jurisdiction, with ALEC a ready-made instrument to demand state-
level change. And there is no reason to think the (unelected) justices
were better situated to evaluate those concerns than their politically
accountable counterparts in statehouses across the country. Put simply,
from a process perspective, personal jurisdiction would seem to be a
classic instance in which an open-ended provision of the Constitution is
better served through deference to a properly functioning democratic
process than by overriding that process with judicial value preferences
imposed from on high.2 72
270. See Mike McIntyre, Conservative Non-Profit Acts as a Stealth Business Lobbyist, NY
TIMES (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/us/alec-a-tax-exempt-group-mixes-
legislators-and-lobbyists.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/4MMB-3KK7].
271. Id.
272. Note that one could arguably reach a different outcome depending on whether one applies
a threshold or one-factor-among-many approach to reverse political process theory. On the
threshold approach, the finding that large corporations are relatively more powerful than small
business and individual defendants would lead to a court automatically declining to grant special
protection to big businesses. But on a one-factor-among-many approach, the desire to defer to a
healthy democratic process could be trumped by other normative values if a judge believed, for
example, that the value of corporate efficiency or jurisdictional simplicity outweighs a desire to
leave difficult public policy decisions in the hands of elected officials.
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B. Waiver Rules
There are two variants of responses to the claim that the
Supreme Court has granted special protection to sovereign defendants
regarding waiver of rights that it has withheld from criminal suspects.
First, one might contend that sovereign defendants actually aren't
particularly powerful by way of comparison. Second, perhaps the
different nature of the constitutional rights at issue-sovereign
immunity on the one hand, and the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination on the other-should matter. Put differently, maybe the
two rights are just incommensurable and the fact of greater protection
for the more powerful group shouldn't trouble us.
1. Are Sovereign Defendants Politically Powerful?
Perhaps sovereign defendants are not especially powerful by
comparison to criminal suspects. One argument to that effect is that
sovereign defendants are not really political participants, much less
powerful ones, to begin with. 2 7 3 To the extent sovereign defendants in
the litigation context are really just the aggregate actions of the
individual government officials alleged to have committed a wrong,
those officials don't lobby the lawmakers with the power to waive
immunity. If anything, government officials actually face special
disabilities to political participation in the form of prohibitions against
lobbying and partisan activity.274
But if political power is understood as an entity's relative ability
to achieve its preferred policy outcomes, 275 then government defendants
may be quite powerful indeed. For one thing, even though government
actors may be barred from lobbying and certain forms of partisan
activity, some government officials have by virtue of their office an
outsized ability to influence the broader public on policy issues by
speaking and writing in public fora. The Washington Attorney General,
273. See Levinson, supra note 229, at 38 ("[T]he ultimate holders of power in American
democracy are not government institutions ... but democratic-level interests.").
274. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7323, 7324 (2012) (delineating Hatch Act limitations on political
activities of federal employees); 18 U.S.C. § 1913 (2012) ("No part of the money appropriated by
any enactment of Congress shall, in the absence of express authorization by Congress, be used
directly or indirectly to pay for any [communication] intended or designed to influence in any
manner a Member of Congress . . . .").
275. Cf. Stephanopoulos, supra note 75, at 1531 ("A group is relatively powerless if its




to use one relevant example, has taken to the op-ed pages to advocate
voter action to narrow the State's sovereign immunity waiver. 276
More importantly, the sovereign interest in avoiding the
burdens of suit is powerfully represented by surrogates-a strong
indication of a group's ability to thrive politically. 277 The most notable
surrogate here is the anti-tax community, exemplified by the group
Americans for Tax Reform. That entity has persuaded forty-eight U.S.
senators, a majority of the U.S. House of Representatives, and a total of
nearly 1,400 elected officials to pledge their opposition to "any and all
efforts to increase" taxes at the federal and state levels. 2 78 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, opposition to current tax rates among the public is
widespread; poll respondents believe by a three-to-two margin that the
current amount of federal income tax they pay is too high,279 and sixty-
nine percent say that taxes are either "extremely important" or "very
important" in influencing their position on the presidential election. 28 0
Given that efforts to preserve or expand sovereign immunity are
commonly framed in terms of reducing government spending (and in
turn keeping tax rates down), 281 it is fair to say that the sovereign
interest in retaining immunity is represented quite forcefully in our
pluralist system.
276. See, e.g., Rob McKenna, Here's a Money-Saving Idea - Stop Abusive Lawsuits Against
Washington Taxpayers, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 24, 2010, 3:54 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/
opinion/heres-a-money-saving-idea-82 12-stop-abusive-lawsuits-against-washington-taxpayers/
[https:/perma.cclA2ZX-ZZ3Y] (outlining the Washington Attorney General's argument in an op-
ed for legislation narrowing the State's waiver of immunity).
277. See Ackerman, supra note 5, at 720 (describing pluralist model in which "myriad pressure
groups, each typically representing a fraction of the population, bargain with one another for
mutual support"). But see Ross & Li, supra note 74, at 377 (noting that "some favorable legislative
actions arise from factors other than a group's political strength").
278. See Take the Taxpayer Protection Pledge, AMS. FOR TAX REFORM, http://www.atr.org/take-
the-pledge (last visited July 16, 2017) [https://perma.cclWBST-BZ3F] (making federal and state
tax pledges available for download); Taxpayer Protection Pledge Database, AMS. FOR TAX REFORM,
http://www.atr.org/pledge-database (last visited July 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9XG5-YADQ]
(showing number of federal elected officials who have signed the pledge); About the Taxpayer
Protection Pledge, AMS. FOR TAX REFORM, http://www.atr.org/about-the-pledge (last visited July
16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6RSG-7YKD] ("Nearly 1,400 elected officials, from state representative
to governor to US Senator, have signed the Pledge.").
279. Taxes, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1714/taxes.aspx (last visited July 16, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/S99M-VL35] (noting that, as of April 2016, fifty-seven percent of respondents
believe that taxes are "too high," compared with thirty-seven percent who say taxes are "about
right" and just three percent who say they are "too low").
280. Frank Newport, Democrats, Republicans Agree on Four Top Issues for Campaign, GALLUP
(Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.gallup.comlpoll/188918/democrats-republicans-agree-four-top-issues-
campaign.aspx [https://perma.ccfM4XU-BG76].
281. See McKenna, supra note 276 (framing sovereign immunity as a way to save money for
Washington taxpayers).
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A second argument pertains to state (as opposed to federal)
immunity in particular. A significant number of contested cases involve
situations where the relevant language bearing on state immunity
appears in a federal statute enacted by Congress, not a state law
waiving the state's own immunity. 282 In such cases, a process theorist
might contend that the clear statement sovereign immunity waiver rule
corrects a defect in the political process because federal lawmakers are
unduly prejudiced against state interests. As Professor Ernest Young
has put it, clear statement rules can "enhance states' political
representation in Congress by providing notice when federalism values
are threatened." 283
Of course, whether the representation of state interests in
Congress is in need of enhancement in the first place is hardly self-
evident. Professor Herbert Wechsler long ago observed that because the
"people to be represented" by the House and Senate are "the people of
the states," federalism interests-at least "[t]o the extent [they] have
real significance"-"cannot fail to find reflection in the Congress."284
Dean Jesse Choper went further, suggesting that because "state
representation in the national executive and legislature places the
President and Congress in a trustworthy position to view the issues
involved in federalism disputes," the Court should declare federalism
disputes nonjusticiable. 28 5 And the Supreme Court has at times shown
affinity to this political safeguards theory, reasoning most notably in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority that state
sovereignty is "more properly protected by procedural safeguards
inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially
created limitations on federal power." 2 8 6 So too here; the people who
vote for Congress can make sure that Congress enacts laws that
preserve state sovereign immunity-assuming, of course, the people
think it is worth preserving to begin with. States may therefore not
always get their way with respect to federal law, but in that sense they
282. See, e.g., supra note 155 (waiver of state immunity in Dellmuth v. Muth arguably
contained in the Education of the Handicapped Act); supra note 160 and accompanying text
(waiver of state immunity in Sossamon arguably contained in RLUIPA).
283. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 121 (2004).
284. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546-47 (1954).
285. Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of
Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1556-57 (1977).
286. 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1986); see also Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 416 (1938)
(reasoning that because "the people of all the states ... are represented in Congress ... [t]he very
fact that when they [exercise the national taxing power] they are taxing themselves serves to guard
against [the taxing power's] abuse").
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are no different than any other group that sometimes wins and
sometimes loses in the pluralist marketplace: they come by their losses
honestly.
To be certain, a number of scholars have taken issue with the
political safeguards theory of federalism, most significantly with the
suggestion that political safeguards render judicial review of federalism
issues unnecessary altogether.287 But even if one agrees that the courts
should remain involved, it is not at all obvious why they should do so by
creating clear statement rules. As Professor William Marshall has
explained, "it is at least incongruous to assume that Congress, as a body
comprised of representatives from the various states," can "protec[t]
states' interests if it is also assumed" that "legislators' allegiance and
duties to the interests of the states as states may not even rise to a level
of consciousness." 28 8 There is, quite simply, no reason to think
congressmen and senators are so ignorant of their states' desire to avoid
costly suits, and so ignorant of the possibility of federal law exposing
their states to such suits, that the political process would be defective
absent a clear statement rule.
A third argument goes further, contending that all sovereign
defendants, state and federal, are actually unfairly prejudiced by the
political process because the people harbor a deep, anti-government
sentiment that may manifest in an overriding desire to hold the
government legally accountable for its wrongs. 289 The trouble with this
argument is that it is far from clear that popular resentment with
government translates into a desire to broaden government amenability
to suit for private wrongs. It is just as plausible (and perhaps more so)
to think the people will express their disapproval by voting out
incumbent officials or even trying to shrink government altogether by
cutting taxes. The latter course would seem to point in the opposite
direction of broad waivers of sovereign immunity, insofar as waivers
actually increase government outlays.
287. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 103-06 (2001) (criticizing calls for declaring federalism disputes
nonjusticiable); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2001) (challenging the view that "political
safeguards represent the only protections for federalism" because such an "exclusive theory is
simply inconsistent with the Constitution's text, structure, and original understanding").
288. William P. Marshall, The Eleventh Amendment, Process Federalism and the Clear
Statement Rule, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 345, 353-54 (1990).
289. To the antigovernment sentiment point, see Art Swift, Approval of Congress Inches Up to
20% in September, GALLUP (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/195632/approval-
congress-inches-september. aspx?g source=congress&g-medium=search&g-campaign=tiles
[https://perma.cclCT75-ANX4] (finding twenty percent of voters approve of Congress's
performance and seventy-six percent disapprove).
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More fundamentally, the government agencies and officials who
are targets of most suits against the state are at bottom just agents of
the people themselves. The notion of the people as principals who hold
deep-rooted prejudice against their own agents that results in a
systematic bias against them (yet who stop short of terminating the
principal-agent relationship itself) is thus rather odd. And while there
is undoubtedly some proper point of equilibrium between protecting
one's agents from the burdens of litigation and ensuring that one's
agents are accountable for wrongdoing, there is little reason to think
the people are unable to strike that balance fairly and properly for
themselves.
2. Are Sovereign Immunity & the Right to Remain Silent
Incommensurable?
If sovereign defendants are properly understood to be more
politically powerful than criminal suspects, another response to
comparing the waiver rules that apply to sovereign defendants and
criminal suspects is that the two are like apples and oranges. Because
the two lines of cases involve different constitutional values, this
response charges, we cannot draw any conclusions from the fact that
the Supreme Court has applied a clear statement waiver rule to the
more powerful group while denying it to the less powerful one.
This is an argument that would matter if there were something
different about the text or history of the relevant constitutional
provisions to shape judicial construction. But there isn't. True, Miranda
rights are often criticized as the product of judicial construction, as
opposed to an inherent part of the Fifth Amendment right to be free
from self-incrimination. 2 9 0 Yet sovereign immunity can easily be
criticized on similar grounds. Whereas the Self-Incrimination Clause at
least appears in the Constitution, there is no textual hook for federal
sovereign immunity and an imperfect one at best for state immunity. 291
That means both lines of doctrine are in some sense the product
of constitutional construction, an especially plausible understanding
given that we are not debating the merits of the underlying rights
themselves, but rather the judge-made rules governing when those
290. See, e.g., Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 173 (2001) (describing Miranda warnings as "a
judge-made preventative rule to protect a suspect's desire not to speak").
291. See generally Tang, supra note 142, at 286-88. But see Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional
Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1871-72 (2012) (arguing that state sovereign immunity
is a background rule for which no reflection in the Constitution's text is needed).
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rights have been waived. And if that is so, then considerations of
political power would seem fair game in both constructive contexts. 292
There are two grounds for nonetheless distinguishing between
the immunity and criminal suspect waiver contexts once we enter the
construction zone with political power as a tool for decision. One is that
the criminal suspect waiver setting entails case-specific findings
regarding individual instances of police conduct, whereas waivers of
sovereign immunity entail something more-namely, exercises of
statutory interpretation. This distinction might matter in the sense
that political process theory is often framed as an approach that grants
heightened judicial protection when the legislative process has
malfunctioned due to prejudice against some powerless minority
group. 293 Reverse political process theory, in other words, might have a
lot to say about what goes on in state assembly meetings where waivers
of sovereign immunity are debated, but little to say about what happens
in police rooms where waivers of individual rights occur.
But as Professor Michael Klarman has convincingly argued, that
is too myopic a view of process theory. "The political process perspective
would be a toothless constitutional theory indeed if, while constraining
the legislative decisionmaking process, it remained silent regarding
legislative delegations of entire subject matter areas," such as criminal
procedure, "to the purview of unelected officials."2 9 4 Legislatures can
thus malfunction in two different ways-by adopting laws that directly
burden politically powerless groups, or by refusing to legislate in a
relevant area at all, thereby leaving discretion to government officials
who act with predictable prejudice against those same groups. Either
malfunction activates political process theory's call for judicial
scrutiny.295 And so conversely, it is fair for reverse political process
theory to compare the ability of government defendants to preserve
their immunity with the ability of criminal suspects to persuade
lawmakers to enshrine more rights-protective police policies.
292. True, one might justify the differential outcomes by taking a one-factor-among-many
approach to reverse political process theory and concluding that (1) a pro-sovereign normative
value overrides the democratic value of letting the sovereign immunity waiver issue sort itself out
without judicial intervention, and (2) no similar pro-criminal-suspect normative value exists in the
Fifth Amendment waiver context. Such an approach is surely defensible as a normative matter,
but it is worth being clear that normative values would be doing that work.
293. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
294. Klarman, supra note 6, at 765-66.
295. See id. at 765 ("A credible political process theory must not only superintend the
legislative process for systemic biases, but also ensure that legislatures retain responsibility for
making important policy choices that govern society.").
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A second critique comes at the problem from the opposite
direction, arguing that the special protection sovereign defendants
receive in the waiver context is just a matter of statutory interpretation,
one that should not trigger process theory concerns in the first place.
Ely's original project, after all, was to fashion a theory of judicial review
for when unelected judges could legitimately strike down democratically
enacted laws under the Constitution. 2 9 6 The Court may be motivated by
underlying constitutional values in the sovereign immunity cases, 2 9 7
but it does not invalidate any laws, instead interpreting statutes in an
arguably counterfactual fashion for lack of a sufficiently explicit waiver.
But should this distinction matter that much? A court may
thwart the will of the majority whether it believes the Constitution
requires it to strike down a duly enacted law or to interpret it to mean
something contrary to its intended effect. Counter-majoritarian acts of
statutory interpretation are theoretically subject to legislative
correction, of course, unlike acts of statutory invalidation. 2 9 8 Recent
empirical work suggests, though, that this phenomenon is somewhat
rare, verging on one or two overrides per year in the aftermath of "a
very significant fall off' in congressional overrides since 1998.299 This
reality lends force to scholarly calls for political process theory to apply
with some force to statutory rulings, too. 30 0 For given the lack of
legislative responsiveness to contestable Supreme Court statutory
interpretations, there may be little practical difference between a ruling
that a particular statute is not as clear as the Constitution requires to
waive sovereign immunity and a ruling that such a waiver would be
constitutionally impermissible altogether. 301
The implication is that statutory waivers of immunity should be
interpreted in just the same way as any other statute-there is no
296. See ELY, supra note 3, at 4-5 ("When a court invalidates an act of the political branches
on constitutional grounds," it is "telling the people's elected representatives that they cannot
govern as they'd like.").
297. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
298. See ELY, supra note 3, at 4 ("[I]n non-constitutional contexts, the court's decisions are
subject to overrule or alteration by ordinary statute.").
299. See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1332 fig.1,
1341 (2014) (identifying just three overrides in four of the last seven biennial congressional
sessions evaluated).
300. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 181, at 153 (arguing that courts "ought to consider, as a
tie-breaker, which party . .. will have effective access to the legislative process if it loses its case,
and to decide the case against the party . .. with significantly more effective access"); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 472-73, 483 (1989)
(proposing that "courts should resolve interpretive doubts in favor of disadvantaged groups").
301. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 13, at 598 (criticizing clear statement rules as "almost
as countermajoritarian as now discredited Lochner-style judicial review").
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constitutional cause to grant sovereign defendants extraordinary
protection from the usual political process. Or at the least, such
defendants should receive no greater judicial solicitude than criminal
suspects who have been powerless to advance their interests before
state legislatures.
C. Opt-Out Rights
Applying reverse political process theory to the case of opt-out
rights from union and corporate political speech yields a notably
different outcome from the preceding examples. The Court's current
approach of requiring an opt-out right in the union political speech
setting, but not the corporate setting, may be defensible on political
process grounds.
The reason is not because the underlying constitutional issues
are materially different. Both circumstances, after all, involve the same
constitutional question: whether First Amendment principles should
entitle objecting persons to opt out of financing the political speech of
an intermediary. The First Amendment underdetermines that question
in various ways (Is money "speech"? Do compelled subsidies "abridge"
the right to free speech, even if so?), so we are in the construction zone.
But once one examines political power as a reason for deference to
legislative choices, a fair assessment of the relevant political actors
reveals that the Court's asymmetrical treatment at least arguably
aligns with the reality of relative political strength.
To understand how, the crucial move is to be very clear about
whose political power matters. The comparison one wants naturally to
draw is between the political power of corporations and unions because
that is the level of comparison where the brunt of the respective opt-out
rules is most often discussed. 302 Even at that level, though, it bears
noting that it is not at all obvious in light of existing data whether
corporations are really more powerful than unions; Professor Eskridge
has found that unions are actually more able to persuade Congress to
override unfavorable judicial statutory interpretations than
corporations. 3 0 3
But the political power comparison that matters here for
purposes of reverse political process theory is not between unions and
corporations; it is between their workers and shareholders-the ones
302. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 19, at 802 (framing the issue as a debate over "the symmetrical
treatment of unions and corporations").
303. ESKRIDGE, supra note 181, at 153.
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actually seeking relief from the courts in the form of a First Amendment
opt-out right from compelled subsidies. 304 At that level, it becomes quite
plausible to think that the group to which the Supreme Court has
granted First Amendment protection (dissenting union workers) may
be less politically powerful as a class than the group to which it has not
(dissenting shareholders).
One problem with this comparison is that we are left to rely in
large part on a gut-level intuition regarding political strength. There is
no ready source of data on the relative likelihood that dissenting union
workers and dissenting corporate shareholders will see their policy
preferences enacted in law, which is the comparison we would need to
decide whether reverse political process theory demands judicial
deference to democratically enacted laws requiring all workers to
subsidize union political speech. 305 But in the absence of such data, it
would likely be reasonable for a court to conclude that the relative
political power of the two groups is too uncertain and too subjective to
serve as a basis for deciding these cases.
D. Discriminatory Purpose
There is a somewhat stronger case for viewing political power as
a reason to treat affirmative action policies burdening whites with the
same level of judicial deference as facially neutral policies with
disparate impacts on minority groups.
To start, this is an area where the empirics concerning relative
power are at their most convincing. Using an enormous data set of
survey responses compiled over twenty-five years on respondents'
preferences regarding more than two thousand public policy issues,
Professor Stephanopoulos has shown a strong, positive correlation
between whites' issue preferences and likelihood of enactment at the
federal level, accompanied by a negative relationship between blacks'
issue preferences and likelihood of enactment. 306 Thus, "as white
[policy] support increases from 0% to 100%, the likelihood of adoption
increases from about 10% to 60%," holding all other variables
constant.307 By contrast, as "black support rises from 0% to 100% ...
304. More specifically, the best analogue is between workers who wish to opt out from fees
used to support union political speech and shareholders who seek a similar right to opt out from
their investments being used to finance corporate political speech.
305. See generally Stephanopoulos, supra note 75 (applying this comparative methodology to
huge datasets to determine political power of various other groups).




the odds of enactment fall from roughly 40% to roughly 30%."308 A
similar relationship exists when white and Hispanic policy preferences
and likelihood of enactment are compared.309 In short, there is
commanding evidence that whites really are more politically powerful,
as a relative matter, than racial minority groups.
So if the comparatively greater scrutiny that the Court has
applied to affirmative action policies burdening whites is to survive, it
must be on the basis of some underlying constitutional difference
between challenges to affirmative action laws and facially neutral laws
with disparate racial impact. As noted earlier, the obvious distinction
to draw is that the former category classifies by race explicitly, whereas
the latter does not.310 On this line of thought, the Court's practice of
treating democratically enacted affirmative action policies more
skeptically than facially neutral policies with a disparate impact can be
justified by an understanding of the Equal Protection Clause as
embodying an anti-classification principle rather than an anti-
subordination principle. And in fact, the conventional contemporary
account of the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence holds
that the Court has proceeded in exactly this fashion.311
Whether the Equal Protection Clause truly stands for a color-
blind, anti-classification principle as opposed to an anti-subordination
or anti-caste principle is beyond the scope of this Article. 312 If one
believes the only permissible reading is that the Clause implements a
color-blind rule, then political power is of no consequence. But where
power may have some purchase is if one believes that the text and
history of the Clause alone cannot answer that question. It may be, in
other words, that the choice between an understanding of the Clause as
a promise of a color-blind Constitution and a promise that laws may not
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1583-84.
310. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
311. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values
in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1470 (2004) (observing that many
today "understand Brown to have ended the era of segregation in America by declaring the
constitutional principle that government may not classify on the basis of race').
312. Much has been written about this debate and the seeming lack of originalist support for
the color-blind view of the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Bickel, supra note 49, at 58 (finding
that "as originally understood," the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to invalidate racial
discrimination in neither "jury service, nor suffrage, nor antimiscegenation statutes, nor
segregation," a fact that cannot be squared with the anti-classification view); Klarman, supra note
1, at 244-45 (explaining the lack of historical support for the anti-classification view of the original
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause); see also Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment
Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 979 (2012) (describing ways in which originalists have yet to
engage with core questions about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the Equal
Protection Clause).
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"perpetuate . .. the subordinate status of a specially disadvantaged
group"3 13 is one ultimately grounded not in legal materials and primary
sources, but normative values.
If that is so, then reverse political process theory may help
pretermit the need for judges to decide which substantive value they
prefer, since the distinct value of deference to democratic will could
drive the outcome instead. On that approach, a court would be required
to treat affirmative action policies burdening whites with no greater
deference than facially neutral laws with a disproportionate burden on
minorities because the policies that whites are challenging in court are
laws that they were more capable of fighting in the ordinary political
arena. 314 If the Court isn't going to intervene to protect the less powerful
group, then it shouldn't insulate the more powerful group from its
political losses, either.
Or, a court could go in the opposite direction and decide for
normative reasons that facially neutral policies with a disparate impact
on racial minorities and affirmative action policies should both be
reviewed stringently. The only approach that would not work is the one
we have, under which the Court actively shelters the more powerful
group from its legislative defeats, even as it leaves less powerful
minority groups to fend for themselves.
E. Mistakes of Law
The case for treating mistake of law defenses in the qualified
immunity context more like the same defense in the criminal
prosecution context is a close call. On the one hand, surely police and
other government officer defendants are, as a class, more capable of
persuading lawmakers to enact legislation actually codifying a qualified
immunity defense than are criminal defendants to enshrine a statutory
mistake of law defense. While there is no data directly comparing the
relative political influence of these two groups, Professor
Stephanopoulos's work finds a strong correlation between policy
enactments and the preferences of different income groups.315 And it
313. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157
(1976).
314. See John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L.
REV. 723, 735 (1974) ("When the group that controls the decision making process classifies so as
to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself, the reasons for ... employing a stringent brand
of review, are lacking.").
315. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 75, at 1586 ("[A]s support at the ninetieth percentile [of
wealth] increases from 0% to 100%, the odds of policy enactment rise from about 10% to 70%. But
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takes no great leap of faith to conclude that the average government
officer falls in a higher income decile than the average criminal
defendant.
On the other hand, perhaps there is something distinctive about
due process fair notice principles in the qualified immunity and
criminal defense mistake of law settings. I think a decent argument can
be made along the following lines: the surface-level similarity between
the officer liability and criminal law contexts, where we want to avoid
punishing someone for conduct that they reasonably did not know was
wrongful, masks a deeper difference. Government officers occupy a role
in which the public interest requires them to take some action; persons
considering a criminal course of conduct have no similar claim. Thus,
the public interest is best served when officers are empowered to
respond to difficult situations in often exigent circumstances (think of
an officer facing a split-second decision over how to end a dangerous
high-speed car chase 316). And that can be achieved by granting officers
a buffer zone to act in difficult gray areas of the law where their conduct
will not result in personal liability. 317
By contrast, when a person considers a course of potentially
unlawful behavior-say, possessing a hand grenade or transporting
dangerous chemicals3 1 8 -that is not the sort of circumstance where
society has an interest in affirmatively encouraging tough, on-the-spot
decisions. Thus, if a reasonable person would have some reason to think
the conduct at issue might be illegal, the burden rests on them to verify
it. A government official, however, should get more leeway, whether
because there may be greater exigency demanding action or because
deciphering the bounds of judicial precedents is more difficult than
reading criminal statutes and regulations. 319 The take-home point is
this: just how much notice is "due" to these two different sets of actors
may depend in part on society's interests in bearing the cost of their
mistakes. And society's interest may be meaningfully higher when it
as support at the tenth percentile [of wealth] varies over the same range, the likelihood falls from
roughly 50% to 20%.").
316. See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014).
317. Or as the Fourth Circuit has put it, "Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas;
they are liable for transgressing bright lines." Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir.
1992).
318. See supra note 195.
319. For other arguments in defense of the asymmetrical treatment of mistake-of-law defenses
in these two contexts, see Larkin, supra note 194, at 100-11.
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comes to insulating officers from reasonable mistakes for all the reasons
given. 320
CONCLUSION
In one sense, what I have argued should be uncontroversial. In
our democratic system, the primary place for sorting out debates over
public policy should be statehouses, not courthouses. Regardless of
what one thinks judges should do when the losers of those debates are
powerless groups who are systematically disadvantaged in the pluralist
bazaar, there is little reason for courts to distrust the outcomes of the
legislative process when the losers are powerful entities whose
preferences usually prevail (at least if what is meant by distrust is the
construction of special constitutional rules out of underdetermined text
and history). That is especially the case, I have argued here, when
courts have denied the same special treatment to powerless groups
before.
Yet the prevailing trend seems to be heading the other way. For
instance, the emerging issue in the law of personal jurisdiction after
Daimler is whether corporations may be found to have consented to
general jurisdiction by virtue of registering to do business within a state
(and appointing an agent for service of process). 321 Commentators have
largely coalesced around the view that the Due Process Clause forbids
states to do so. 3 2 2 Much of the analytical foundation for that conclusion
320. But see id. at 73 (arguing for equal treatment by granting more generous protection to
criminal defendants because "[i]f the law is willing to countenance reasonable mistakes that
government officials make, it also should be willing to forgive the reasonable mistakes that the
rest of us make"). Note that there are many powerful arguments in the scholarship that the Court
has gone too far in affording qualified immunity to mistakes by government officials. See, e.g.,
Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117 (2009); Fred Smith, Local Sovereign
Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409, 411 (2016). Far from contradicting these persuasive accounts,
I mean only to suggest that there is a colorable argument that some base-level difference exists
that may justify differential treatment between the criminal and qualified immunity mistake-of-
law contexts.
321. See, e.g., Jack Preis, The Next Personal Jurisdiction Issue for the Supreme Court,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 19, 2016, 10:11 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2016/09/the-next-personal-jurisdiction-issue-for-the-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/S3MV-
WED2] (suggesting the consent issue "will percolate up to the Court by the October 2018 term").
322. See, e.g., Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy
of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1346 (2015) ("Registration to do business as a basis for
general jurisdiction . .. rests on dubious constitutional footing."); see also Charles W. "Rocky"
Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a Twenty-First Century World, 64
FLA. L. REV. 387, 436-44 (2012) (similar); Kevin D. Benish, Note, Pennoyer's Ghost: Consent,
Registration Statutes, and General Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1609, 1613-14 (2015) (similar).
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is an extension of the reasoning set forth in Daimler.323 But how would
a Court rule if it took political process theory's negative command as
the starting point for its analysis instead?
To test that question, assume a state enacts a law that explicitly
declares that compliance with its registration and appointment laws is
both necessary to do business in the state and constitutes a
corporation's consent to general jurisdiction. 324 The text of the Due
Process Clause obviously does not answer whether this is permissible.
The threshold version of reverse political process theory would
therefore ask whether corporations possess more political power to fend
for their own interests in the democratic process than some less
powerful group that the Court has already denied constitutional
protection in a similar circumstance.
As noted above, it is an uncontroversial proposition that
corporations possess a healthy dose of political power. 325 And the Court
has recently refused to extend similar constitutional protections to a
less powerful group in the analogous context of conditions on motor
vehicle licensing. In that setting, the Court has held that a state may
condition receipt of a driver's license on consent to a blood draw to
determine one's blood-alcohol content.326 The burdened groups in both
contexts possess an important interest-the ability to drive and the
ability to do business in a state-that may be necessary in the modern
economy. And the state seeks to condition both interests on consent to
a practice it could not perform directly under the Constitution-
323. See, e.g., Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 142 (Del. 2016) (reversing prior
interpretation of Delaware registration statute as authorizing consent to general jurisdiction "[iun
light of Daimler"); Benish, supra note 322, at 1625 ("After Daimler, registration statutes cannot
serve as a constitutional basis for general jurisdiction . . . .").
324. There are two distinct issues at play in the registration-as-consent cases: first, whether a
corporation actually consented to general jurisdiction by virtue of registering to do business and
appointing an agent, and second, whether such consent would violate the Due Process Clause. The
Delaware Supreme Court rejected registration-as-consent on the first ground, largely because
"[n]othing in the statutes explicitly says that by having to register ... and to appoint a registered
agent . . . a foreign corporation was waiving any objection to [general] personal jurisdiction." Cepec,
137 A.3d at 142; see also Monestier, supra note 322, at 1386 (similar). In order to avoid the first
(statutory) question and get directly at the second (constitutional) one, my hypothetical posits that
a state puts companies on clear notice that consent to general jurisdiction is a consequence of
compliance with its corporate registration and appointment statutes.
325. See supra Section W.A. Note that the analysis would be slightly different here, since the
corporate consent statute burdens all corporations, big and small-not just the largest companies
(as was true of Daimler). Yet even if small business were itself powerless, the fact that its interests
are aligned with big business's interests in this context suggests that there is no malfunction of
the political process with respect to any of the burdened entities.
326. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016) (noting that the Court has
"referred approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties
and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply").
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warrantless blood draws and general jurisdiction outside of a company's
state of incorporation and principal place of business. To be certain,
drivers who sometimes have a few drinks (and who may accordingly
fear the results of a blood test) are hardly a classic politically powerless
minority group. But they could well constitute a diffuse and anonymous
majority that faces obstacles to organization in our pluralist system. 327
At the least, such drivers are less politically apt to defend their interests
before state legislatures than corporations faced with registration
consent statutes that threaten to dramatically increase their litigation
exposure. And so given that the Court has decided not to intervene to
protect the less powerful class of individual drivers, it should not
intervene to protect the more powerful group of corporations, either.328
Whether the Court will actually decide this issue with political
process considerations in mind is, of course, ultimately little more than
conjecture. But the kernel of insight I hope to have established is this:
a candid judiciary would acknowledge that, like with so many
important constitutional questions that arise over time, the answer to
whether states may require corporations to consent to general
jurisdiction by registration cannot be located in the text and history of
the Due Process Clause. The Court may well choose to construct an
answer to that question that favors corporations. But if it does so, it
would be taking an implicit view on who should decide this complex
issue of economic policy-unelected judges or democratically elected
lawmakers. In my view, when one considers the political influence of
the corporate entities seeking relief, the better answer is elected
lawmakers. But as political process theory's third act reveals, that
answer is in recent years too often the proverbial road not taken. 329
327. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
328. It bears emphasizing that I am not wedded to this particular outcome, only to parity of
treatment between the two groups. Thus, if the Court wishes to rule that registration by consent
is an unconstitutional condition, that would be reasonable enough so long as the same analysis is
followed for implied consent laws governing blood draws.
329. ROBERT FROST, THE ROAD NOT TAKEN (1916), reprinted in THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: A
SELECTION OF ROBERT FROST'S POEMS 270-71 (Louis Untermeyer ed. 2002).
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